Going  Clear by Doerfler, Ryan D
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
1-31-2019 
Going "Clear" 
Ryan D. Doerfler 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, 
Law and Society Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Public Law and Legal Theory Commons 
Repository Citation 
Doerfler, Ryan D., "Going "Clear"" (2019). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 2051. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/2051 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
GOING “CLEAR” 




INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 3 
I. “CLARITY” DOCTRINES ................................................................................... 8 
A. Evidence-Management ............................................................................... 9 
B. Uncertainty-Management ........................................................................ 12 
II. CATEGORICAL OBJECTIONS ...................................................................... 19 
A. No Consensus What Required .................................................................. 20 
B. Inevitably Biased Application .................................................................. 27 
III. APPLICATIONS .......................................................................................... 34 
A. Constitutional Avoidance ......................................................................... 35 
B. Lenity ........................................................................................................ 42 
C. Legislative History ................................................................................... 48 
D. Chevron/Skidmore .................................................................................. 53 








Ryan D. Doerfler* 
This Article proposes a new framework for evaluating doctrines that assign 
significance to whether a statutory text is “clear.”  As previous scholarship has 
failed to recognize, such doctrines come in two distinct types.  The first, which 
this Article call evidence-management doctrines, instruct a court to “start with 
the text,” and to proceed to other sources of statutory meaning only if absolutely 
necessary.  Because they structure a court’s search for what a statute means, the 
question with each of these doctrines is whether adhering to it aids or impairs 
that search—the character of the evaluation is, in other words, mostly 
epistemic.  The second type, which this Article call uncertainty-management 
doctrines, instead tell a court to decide a statutory case on some ground other 
than statutory meaning if, after considering all the available sources, what the 
statute means remains opaque.  The idea underlying these doctrines is that if 
statutory meaning is uncertain, erring in some direction constitutes “playing it 
safe.”  With each such doctrine, the question is thus whether erring in the 
identified direction really is “safer” than the alternative(s)—put differently, 
evaluation of these doctrines is fundamentally practical. 
This Article goes on to address increasingly popular categorical objections to 
“clarity” doctrines.  As this Article explains, the objection that nobody knows 
how clear a text has to be to count as “clear” rests partly on a misunderstanding 
of how “clarity” determinations work—such determinations are sensitive to 
context, including legal context, in ways critics of these doctrines fail to account 
for.  In addition, the objection that “clarity” doctrines are vulnerable to 
willfulness or motivated reasoning is fair but, as this Article shows, applies with 








                                                          
* Walter V. Schaefer Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago, 
The Law School; Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
Thanks to William Baude, Mitchell Berman, Richard Fallon, Jonah Gelbach, Roderick 
Hills, Aziz Huq, Howell Jackson, John Manning, Jeffrey Pojanowski, David Pozen, 
Frederick Schauer, and Matthew Stephenson for helpful comments and suggestions. 





Everyone agrees that courts must adhere to “clear” or “plain” 
text.1  But what to do when a statute is “ambiguous” or its meaning is 
otherwise uncertain?2  Numerous legal doctrines condition the 
permissibility of some judicial action in a statutory case upon the statute 
at issue being less than “clear” or “plain.”  Courts may, for example, 
consider legislative history,3 defer to an administering agency,4 or avoid 
answering a constitutional question5 if a statutory text has more than 
one plausible meaning, but not otherwise.  Taken together, these various 
doctrines make textual “clarity” (or, alternatively, “plainness”) the 
central organizing principle for much of the law of statutory 
interpretation.6  And, indeed, the same has been true (albeit to varying 
degrees7) going back to Chief Justice Marshall, who remarked that 
where “words in the body of the statute” are “plain,” there is “nothing … 
                                                          
1 As a matter of positive law, that is.  E.g., Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016) (“[P]olicy arguments cannot supersede the clear 
statutory text.”); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438 (1999) (“As in any 
case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute.  
And where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 
76, 95–96 (1820) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The intention of the legislature is to be collected 
from the words they employ.  Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no 
room for construction.”). 
2 Ralf Poscher, Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE AND LAW 128, 128 (Lawrence Solan & Peter Tiersma eds. 
2012) (observing that “[i]n a colloquial sense, both vagueness and ambiguity are 
employed generically to indicate indeterminacy,” but that “[i]n a more technical sense 
… ambiguity and vagueness are far more specific phenomena”). 
3 N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 942 (2017); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 
U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (“[W]e do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory 
text that is clear.”). 
4 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
5 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (When the validity of an act of the Congress 
is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a 
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”). 
6 See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1079, 1082 (2017) (“Interpretation isn’t just a matter of language; it’s also governed by 
law.”). 
7 See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543–544 
(1940) (“When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is 
available, there certainly can be no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the 
words may appear on superficial examination.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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left to construction,” but that where “ambiguit[y]” remains, “the mind … 
seizes every thing from which aid can be derived.”8 
As a doctrinal “linchpin,”9 a great deal often turns on whether a 
statutory text is “clear” (or “plain”) or not.10  Perhaps for that reason, 
however, scholars and jurists have started to question whether it makes 
sense, either in principle or as a matter of practice, to assign so much 
importance to that determination.  Some critics have asked, for example, 
why courts should “seize” that “from which aid can be derived” only if 
the text is “ambiguous.”11  Or, as Justice Stevens put it, “[W]hy … 
confine ourselves to … the statutory text if other tools of statutory 
construction provide better evidence”?12  Others even more skeptical 
have queried whether we even know what it means to say that a 
statutory text is “clear.”13  Hence Judge Easterbrook, with characteristic 
bluntness: “There is no metric for clarity.”14 
 This Article attempts to clarify15 the discussion surrounding 
these various “clarity” doctrines.  As it explains, such doctrines can 
actually be sorted into two distinct types, with largely distinct concerns 
associated with each.  The first type, which operate as evidence-
management doctrines, structure a court’s inquiry into what a statute 
means.16  More specifically, these doctrines tell courts to “start with the 
text,”17 and to consider additional sources of statutory meaning only if 
                                                          
8 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. 358, 386 (1805). 
9 Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F Guzior, & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An 
Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 257 (2010) 
(“Determinations of ambiguity are the linchpin of statutory interpretation.”). 
10 Lawrence M. Solan, Pernicious Ambiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 859, 861 (2004) (“Part of the problem is that the law has only two ways to 
characterize the clarity of a legal text: It is either plain or it is ambiguous.  The 
determination is important.”). 
11 See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 539 (2017); Adam M. Samaha, If the Text is Clear: Lexical Ordering in Statutory 
Interpretation 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2018). 
12 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 106 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
13 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118 
(2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). 
14 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 62 (1988) (emphasis added). 
15 (Ha ha.) 
16 See infra Part I.A. 
17 Adam M. Samaha, Starting with the Text—On Sequencing Effects in Statutory 
Interpretation and Beyond, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 439, 440 (2016). 
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absolutely necessary.18  Because they organize a court’s investigation 
into statutory meaning, the concerns associated with this type of 
doctrine are largely epistemic.  For reasons this Article explains, this 
sort of lexical ordering of evidence hinders an investigation except in 
unusual circumstances.19  With any evidence-management doctrine, 
then, the question is whether it applies only in those specific situations. 
The second type of “clarity” doctrine, which operate by contrast as 
uncertainty-management doctrines, instruct a court how to decide a 
statutory case when, despite its best efforts, it isn’t sure what the statute 
at issue means.20  In other words, the function of the second type of 
doctrine is not to help determine the meaning of a statute, but rather to 
provide guidance for how to proceed once it becomes apparent that the 
meaning of a statute is not.  The basic premise underlying uncertainty-
management doctrines is that, under conditions of uncertainty, 
sometimes erring in a particular direction constitutes “playing it safe.”21  
The concerns associated with these doctrines are, in light of that 
premise, mostly practical.  In each instance, the question is whether a 
court’s erring in the identified direction is actually “safer” than acting 
on its “best guess” or, alternatively, erring in some other direction. 
Using this basic distinction, this Article develops a novel and 
administrable framework for assessing individual “clarity” doctrines.  
Within that framework, one asks first whether a given doctrine manages 
evidence or, instead, manages uncertainty.  If the doctrine manages 
evidence, one then goes on to determine whether the type of evidence it 
manages has some or all of the special characteristics that make lexical 
                                                          
18 Here and throughout, this Article uses the phrase “statutory meaning” to refer to 
the communicative content expressed by statutory text as used—roughly, Congress’s 
apparent communicative intention (or, alternatively, the conventional meaning of the 
language as used in the relevant context).  See Mitchell N. Berman, The Tragedy of 
Justice Scalia, 115 MICH. L. REV. 783, 796-99 (2017) (distinguishing communicative 
intention from other forms of intention); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Meaning 
of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1235, 1246-48 (2015) (calling this a statute’s “contextual” meaning).  This 
Article takes no position on how best to conceive of Congress’s communicative intention 
(e.g., actual or “objectified”) or how best to identify it (e.g., whether to consider 
legislative history). 
19 See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra Part I.B. 
21 Here and throughout this Article uses the term “uncertainty” in a colloquial sense, 
encompassing both “risk” and “uncertainty” in the technical, decision-theoretic senses 
of those terms.  See DANIEL M HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 30-31 (1996) (contrasting situations of “risk,” in 
which the probabilities of the various possible outcomes are known, and situations of 
“uncertainty,” in which those probabilities are unknown). 
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ordering of evidence epistemically sensible.  If, alternatively, the 
doctrine manages uncertainty, one instead evaluates the risk analysis 
that underlies it: is one type of mistake really costlier than the other, as 
the doctrine presupposes, and, if so, to what degree?   
In addition to facilitating this sort of individual doctrinal 
assessment, the distinction between evidence management and 
uncertainty management provides a principled basis for answering 
longstanding questions concerning the relationship between different 
“clarity” doctrines, in particular the order in which such doctrines 
should be applied.22  As this Article explains, because uncertainty-
management doctrines help manage uncertainty that remains after the 
search for statutory meaning, it will almost always make sense for 
courts to apply any relevant evidence-management doctrine (e.g., the 
conditional admissibility of legislative history or Skidmore) before 
determining whether a statute is or is not “clear” for purposes of some 
uncertainty-management doctrine (e.g., the rule of lenity or Chevron).23 
This Article goes on to address increasingly popular categorical 
objections to “clarity” doctrines.24  According to numerous jurists and 
scholars, all “clarity” doctrines are worrisome insofar as there is no 
consensus among judges as to how clear a statutory text has to be to 
                                                          
22 See Abbe R. Gluck, Justice Scalia’s Unfinished Business in Statutory Interpretation: 
Where Textualism’s Formalism Gave Up, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2053, 2063 (2017) 
(“It remains unanswered whether a policy canon is still relevant if legislative history 
alone would clarify statutory language.”); James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the 
Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2010) 
(worrying that the “lack of an intelligible framework for ordering the canons renders 
them distinctly more susceptible to judicial manipulation than other interpretive 
resources”). 
23 See infra Parts III.C & D. 
24 See infra Part II. 
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count as “clear.”25  Is 65-35 enough, or does “clarity” require 90-10?26  
Beyond that, many fear that because it is easy for judges to exaggerate 
or understate—whether consciously or unconsciously—how clear a text 
is, such doctrines facilitate results-oriented decision making and thus 
undermine public confidence in an impartial judiciary.27  If “clarity” 
judgments are mere reflections of partisan attitudes, these critics 
suggest, adherence to “clarity” doctrines undermines the rule of law. 
As this Article explains, the lack of a universal “clarity” standard 
should be both unsurprising and unconcerning.28  To say that a statutory 
text is “clear” is, in effect, to say that it is clear enough for present 
purposes.  And since purposes vary from case to case—and, in particular, 
from doctrine to doctrine—so too, one should expect, does the degree of 
clarity required.29  Relatedly, if judges disagree about how clear a text 
                                                          
25 See Meredith A. Holland, The Ambiguous Ambiguity Inquiry: Seeking to Clarify 
Judicial Determinations of Clarity Versus Ambiguity in Statutory Interpretation, 93 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2018) (“[T]here is no established method governing 
the judge’s threshold determination of ambiguity versus clarity.  In fact, there is no 
consistent definition of ambiguity.”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Absence of Method in 
Statutory Interpretation, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 90 (2017) (“[T]he Justices do not agree 
on what ‘ambiguity’ means for purposes of the rule [of lenity].”); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, 
Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1082 (2016) (noting “lurking questions about 
how hard courts ought to work before deciding whether a statute is clear”); Kavanaugh, 
supra note 13, at 1238 (“The simple and troubling truth is that no definitive guide 
exists for determining whether statutory language is clear or ambiguous.”); Antonin 
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
511, 520 (“Here, of course, is the chink in Chevron’s armor—the ambiguity that 
prevents it from being an absolutely clear guide to future judicial decisions (though 
still a better one than what it supplanted).  How clear is clear?”). 
26 Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 1237. 
27 Id. at 1237-38; Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and 
Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1304 (2002) (“On other 
occasions, however, the Justices may reveal substantive policy preferences not in 
formulating rules, but in applying them.”); Easterbrook, supra note 14, at 62 (“[C]ourts 
may choose when to declare the language of the statute ‘ambiguous.’”); see also Solan, 
supra note 10, at 859 (“The problem, perhaps ironically, is that the concept of 
ambiguity is itself perniciously ambiguous. People do not always use the term in the 
same way, and the differences often appear to go unnoticed.”); see also William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional 
Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992) (suggesting that variation in the degree 
of clarity required reflect “the Court's view of what is an important constitutional 
value,” as well as “the relative importance of different constitutional values”). 
28 See infra Part II.A. 
29 As with “intention,” this Article takes no position on how best to conceive of or 
identify a legal doctrine’s underlying “purpose(s).”  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian 
Vermeule, The Morality of Administrative Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1924, 1944-47 
(2018) (discussing Chevron in light of administrative law’s “internal morality”). 
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must be in some specific case, that is, at least very often, just a legal 
dispute about the purposes of the applicable doctrine. 
On results-oriented decision making, this Article argues that 
what critics have identified is, for the most part, the familiar and 
entirely general worry that, in close cases, judges can mischaracterize 
the law without serious reputational harm.30  While true that a judge 
can with a straight face (and, perhaps, a clean conscience) insist that a 
very likely reading of a statute is “clearly” correct (or vice versa), it is 
equally easy for a judge to declare “more likely than not” a reading that 
is somewhat unlikely.  As such, by increasing the probability threshold 
a reading must satisfy for a court to enforce it from the typical “more 
likely than not” to the more demanding “clear,” “clarity” doctrines do 
nothing to increase opportunity for judicial willfulness or motivated 
reasoning.  What they do instead is merely shift the site of plausible 
argumentation. 
This Article has three Parts.  Part I distinguishes between two 
types of “clarity” doctrines, evidence-management and uncertainty-
management, identifying concerns specific to each.  Part II considers 
common objections to “clarity” doctrines generally, explaining why those 
objections are either misguided or generic.  Part III shows this Article’s 
proposed framework in action, assessing various familiar “clarity” 
doctrines, with some passing the assessment and some not. 
 
I. “CLARITY” DOCTRINES 
 
 It is a platitude that courts may not deviate from “clear” statutory 
text.  What exactly this platitude entails is a matter of some confusion.  
As this Part explains, a host of doctrines within statutory interpretation 
are fashioned as complements to the consensus position that “when the 
intent of Congress is clear from the statutory text, that is the end of the 
matter.”31  Each of these doctrines permits a court to attend to 
something other than statutory text, but only if the text in question 
leaves the intent of Congress unknown.32 
                                                          
30 See infra Part II.B. 
31 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 105 (2007) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
32 Again, however congressional “intent” is best conceived.  See supra note 18 and 
accompanying text. 
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 Despite their apparent similarity, these various “clarity” 
doctrines come in two importantly different varieties—varieties that 
reflect a basic ambiguity in courts’ insistence upon the importance of 
“clear” statutory text. 
 As this Part explains, the first variety of “clarity” doctrine let 
courts consider various sources of statutory meaning only if considering 
the statutory text in isolation leaves a statute’s meaning uncertain.  
Such evidence-management doctrines are peculiar, epistemically 
speaking.  Ordinarily, sources of evidence are either helpful to consider 
or not.  Harder to see is why the helpfulness of considering one source 
(e.g., legislative history) might turn upon the probative value of some 
other (e.g., statutory text).  As this Part goes on to show, there are 
unusual circumstances in which this sort of conditional admissibility of 
evidence does make sense—for instance, if evidence is probative but, for 
reasons of psychological bias, one is disposed to overweight it.  Less 
clear, though, is whether familiar evidence-management doctrines like 
the plain meaning rule are appropriately limited to those unusual 
circumstances. 
 As this Part continues, the second variety of “clarity” doctrine 
instruct courts to decide statutory cases on grounds other than statutory 
meaning if, after considering all available sources, what a statute means 
remains unclear.  These uncertainty-management doctrines are, in 
contrast to evidence-management doctrines, epistemically 
straightforward.  A familiar approach to reasoning under conditions of 
uncertainty is to err in some direction on the rationale of “playing it 
safe.”  An assumption underlying this approach, of course, is that one 
type of mistake is much worse to make than the other, either 
individually or in the aggregate.  When it comes to familiar uncertainty-
management doctrines like the canon of constitutional avoidance, the 
question is thus whether the cost assignments underlying those 
doctrines are accurate.  Is it really much worse, for example, to misread 





 Sometimes when a court says that statutory text is “clear,” what 
it means is that the meaning of a statute can be discerned by attending 
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to its text exclusively.  In Milner v. Navy,33 for example, the question 
was whether a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) exemption for 
material “related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of 
an agency” included data and maps pertaining to the storage of 
explosives at a naval base.34  The Court held that no.  As Justice Kagan 
explained, the exemption’s limitation to “personnel” matters plainly 
excluded maps and data unrelated to “employee relations [or] human 
resources.”35  Responding to the suggestion that a House Report 
concerning FOIA supported the opposite conclusion, she remarked that 
while legislative history may help “illuminate ambiguous text,” it may 
not be appealed to for the purpose of “muddy[ing] clear statutory 
language.”36  In calling the language of the exemption “clear,” Justice 
Kagan was thus indicating that there was no need to consider 
extratextual evidence—in this case, legislative history—to figure out 
what that exemption means. 
 One way to understand the platitude that courts must adhere to 
“clear” statutory text is, then, as an instruction to courts to prioritize 
textual evidence of statutory meaning over other, extratextual evidence.  
So understood, this platitude expresses what is sometimes referred to 
as the “plain meaning” rule.37  The plain meaning rule is, in reality, a 
cluster of specific rules, each of which relates to some extratextual 
source of statutory meaning—legislative history,38 institutional 
practice,39 statutory titles,40 etc.  Each specific rule permits a court to 
consider the source at issue, but only if the available textual evidence 
leaves statutory meaning uncertain.  In this way, the plain meaning rule 
imposes lexical ordering on a court’s investigation into statutory 
                                                          
33 562 U.S. 562 (2011). 
34 Id. at 564-65 (2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)). 
35 Id. at 569, 581. 
36 Id. at 572; see also id. at 574 (“Legislative history, for those who take it into account, 
is meant to clear up ambiguity, not create it.”). 
37 Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11, at 541 (“The plain meaning rule says that 
otherwise-relevant information about statutory meaning is forbidden when the 
statutory text is plain or unambiguous.”). 
38 United States v. Woods, 571 U.S. 31, 46 n.5 (2013) (“Whether or not legislative 
history is ever relevant, it need not be consulted when, as here, the statutory text is 
unambiguous.”). 
39 Milner, 562 U.S. at 575-76 (reasoning that “clear statutory language” makes 
irrelevant “30 years” of contrary practice by lower courts); United States v. Ron Pair 
Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 245–46 (1989) (reasoning that “pre-Code practice” is 
relevant only if statutory text is less than “clear”). 
40 Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–529 (1947) (recognizing 
“the wise rule that the title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the 
plain meaning of the text”). 
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meaning: Start with the statutory text and proceed to other sources only 
if absolutely necessary.41 
 This “start with the text” approach to statutory interpretation 
might seem like a sensible intermediate position between strict 
textualism and some form of all-things-considered eclecticism or 
pragmatism.  Upon reflection, though, the lexical ordering of 
interpretive sources gives rise to a puzzle.42  Ordinarily, information is 
either helpful to an investigation or not.  For that reason, policies of 
categorical inclusion or exclusion of specific types of information are 
easy to understand and, unsurprisingly, familiar features of our legal 
landscape.  To illustrate, in the eyes of Congress, cost is a relevant 
consideration when assessing whether to regulate emissions from 
stationary sources like power plants or factories.  The Environmental 
Protection Agency is thus required to at least consider cost when 
deciding whether regulate such sources, even when the noneconomic 
concerns are overwhelming.43  By contrast, cost is, in Congress’s view, 
irrelevant when evaluating threshold nuclear safety measures.  Hence, 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission may not consider cost when 
determining what is “adequate protection to the health and safety of the 
public.”44 
More difficult to understand are policies of conditional inclusion 
or exclusion of certain information.  For example, if legislative history is 
evidence of statutory meaning, why not consider it in all statutory cases?  
Even if textual evidence points strongly in one direction, what is the 
harm in at least looking at that extratextual source?  Alternatively, if 
legislative history is irrelevant or misleading for purposes of 
interpretation, why consider it ever?  Even if textual evidence is largely 
unhelpful in some case, considering an irrelevant or misleading source 
can only make things worse. 
 As it turns out, there are at least a couple of potential answers to 
the rhetorical questions above.45  If certain information is especially 
                                                          
41 See Samaha, supra note 11, at *7-8 (explaining lexical ordering); see also Adam M. 
Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1661 (2010) (exploring the use of 
lexically inferior decision rules as legal “tiebreakers”). 
42 This puzzle is articulated more fully in Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11, at 546-49. 
43 See Michigan v EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707-08 (2015). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 2232(a); Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Comm’n, 824 F.2d 108, 114 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that “[t]he Commission must 
determine, regardless of costs, the precautionary measures necessary to provide 
adequate protection to the public”). 
45 See Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11, at 549-65 (surveying possible answers). 
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costly to consider, for example, it would make sense, assuming limited 
resources, to start by considering cheaper information.46  If one can rule 
out a restaurant based on the menu, there is no reason to try it in 
person.47  Somewhat differently, if information is probative but, for 
reasons of psychological bias, one is disposed to overweight it, one might 
be justified in turning to that information only if non-biasing 
information leaves one uncertain.48  Job talks by aspiring academics, for 
instance, may do more harm than good if the paper record is clear.  Such 
talks may at the same time prove helpful if, after considering written 
materials, the faculty finds itself on the fence. 
 These sorts of special considerations may or may not support the 
assorted evidence-management doctrines that make up the plain 
meaning rule.  Legislative history is conceivably too expensive to 
consider as a matter of course.  But statutory titles?  Hardly so.  Beyond 
that, lexically ordering sources of statutory meaning introduces 
opportunity for willfulness or motivate reasoning that may swamp any 
would-be efficiency gains.  This objection is considered more fully 
below.49  Very briefly, though, it is not hard to see how a willful or 
motivated judge might exaggerate how clear textual evidence makes 
things, thereby excluding from consideration other, less convenient 
evidence.  Importantly, the costs of exaggeration and understatement of 
textual clarity are asymmetrical with such “plain meaning” doctrines 
insofar as understatement results only in marginal underweighting of 
textual evidence, whereas overstatement results in the total exclusion 




 Other times, in calling statutory language “clear,” what a court 
means is that statutory meaning is apparent based upon whichever 
source(s).  Within the Chevron framework, courts defer to the policy 
judgment of an administering agency unless “Congress has spoken 
clearly” on the issue.50  To see whether Congress has made itself 
                                                          
46 Id. at 549-51. 
47 A vegan, for example, deciding against a steakhouse. 
48 Id. at 552-54. 
49 See infra Part II.B. 
50 City of Arlington, Tex. v. F.C.C., 569 U.S. 290, 308 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
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sufficiently clear, courts employ the “traditional tools of statutory 
construction,” which include most obviously attention to statutory text, 
but also consideration of, for example, linguistic canons,51 practical 
consequences,52 and, for those who consider it at all, legislative history.53  
Hence, as Justice Scalia explained, “[a] statutory provision that may 
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified” as additional information 
gets folded in.54 
 The other way to hear the platitude that courts must adhere to 
“clear” text is, accordingly, as forbidding courts from substituting, say, 
more desirable policy for identifiable statutory meaning.  Interpreted 
this way, the platitude is a complement to numerous legal doctrines that 
purport not to aid in the search for statutory meaning, but instead to 
help courts decide cases when statutory meaning remains opaque.  
Again, Chevron is the most straightforward example.  Within that 
framework, courts defer to an administering agency only if a statute is 
“silent” or “ambiguous” on the question at issue.55  Even more explicitly, 
courts say that filling such a statutory “gap” requires a “policy choice” 
on the part of the administering agency.56  Taken together, such 
remarks suggest that Chevron deference has nothing to do with 
identifying statutory meaning.57  Rather, it is only if statutory meaning 
cannot be identified—again, after employing all the traditional tools—
that deferring to an administering agency is called for. 
 Unlike the evidence-management doctrines discussed above, 
doctrines like Chevron are, in terms of structure, epistemically 
straightforward.  Because an administering agency is not an authority 
on what a statute means, it makes sense for a court not to defer to that 
                                                          
51 See National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 
U.S. 479, 500, 502 (1998). 
52 See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. E.P.A., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014) (rejecting an 
agency reading based partly on the “calamitous consequences of interpreting the Act 
in that way”). 
53 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (“If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation 
of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency’s care by the statute, we 
should not disturb it unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that 
the accommodation is not one that Congress would have sanctioned.” (emphasis added) 
(quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 383 (1961))). 
54 Util. Air, 134 S. Ct. at 2442. 
55 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
56 Id. at 866. 
57 In this respect, the Chevron framework differs interestingly from the earlier 
approach to agency deference articulated in Skidmore v. Swift. See infra Part III.C. 
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agency when investigating statutory meaning.58  But sometimes 
investigations into statutory meaning come up empty, or at least leave 
courts less than certain.  What to do then?  One approach is for a court 
to give its “best guess,” enforcing the reading of the statute it thinks is 
most likely correct.  That is what courts do in run-of-the-mill statutory 
cases—and, really, all that they can do when there is no other legal basis 
for deciding the case.59 
Another approach, though, is for a court to err in a certain 
direction, enforcing a reading that is, for some reason, safer even if it is 
less likely correct than some other.  The idea of “playing it safe” is 
familiar from everyday life.60  Suppose, for example, that leaving for the 
airport at 8:30 AM would only “probably” allow one to make one’s flight.  
Barring unusual circumstances, one would opt in that situation to leave 
a bit earlier, reasoning that it is better to wait around at the gate than 
to be left there.  The same reasoning might easily apply in a statutory 
case.  If reading A is only “probably” correct, and erroneously enforcing 
reading B (also plausible, let’s assume) would be much less costly than 
erroneously enforcing reading A, enforcing reading B might constitute 
the safer course of action even though reading A is more likely correct.   
As with any other type of decision, the reason(s) might vary 
significantly why erroneously enforcing one reading of a statute would 
be less costly than erroneously enforcing some other.  Most 
straightforwardly, misinterpreting a statute one way might yield 
immediate consequences that are much worse than those that would 
result from the opposite type of mistake.61   Alternatively, one type of 
mistake might be less costly to correct.62  Moving beyond individual 
                                                          
58 At least, not a legal authority.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 27 (1983) (“To be sure, the court must interpret the statute; it must decide what has 
been committed to the agency.”).  An administering agency may, nonetheless, be an 
epistemic authority on the issue.  See infra notes 279-291 and accompanying text. 
59 Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
984, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 2701 (2005) (contrasting cases in which a court decides a case 
based upon the “best reading” of a statute with those in which a court a court 
determines there is only one “permissible reading”). 
60 See Ryan D. Doerfler, High-Stakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REV. 523, 549-51 
(2018). 
61 In addition, the types of consequences at issue might vary, ranging from concrete 
harms to individuals (e.g., erroneously imposed fines or imprisonment) to abstract 
harms to institutions (e.g., a loss of legitimacy). 
62 Here, an everyday analogy would be something like deciding whether to send an 
email/text late at night.  Come morning, one type of mistake is ordinarily much easier 
to correct than the other. 
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decisions, erring in a particular direction might be less costly on average 
or in the aggregate, in which case courts would reduce costs by erring 
that way in the relevant class of cases.63 
Numerous legal doctrines instruct courts to err in some direction 
when deciding a certain type of statutory case absent “clear” statutory 
meaning.  The premise of these doctrines seems to be that erring in the 
specified direction amounts to “playing it safe” in those cases.  Again, 
within the Chevron framework, courts defer to an administering 
agency’s policy judgment unless the statute at issue is “clear.”  This 
means that in some situations, a court will defer to an agency even 
though it thinks that some other reading is more likely to be correct as 
a matter of interpretation.64  Implicit in that rule of decision, then, is 
that it is safer to err in the direction of an agency’s policy judgment if 
statutory meaning is uncertain.  Better to leave in place an agency policy 
(or agency policies65) Congress has precluded, in other words, then to 
displace one that it has not. 
 One may or may not agree with Chevron’s underlying substantive 
assessment.66  With any uncertainty-management doctrine, there is 
always the question whether the doctrine manages uncertainty wisely.  
To use another example, the canon of constitutional avoidance seems to 
presuppose that misreading and then enforcing a statute is much better 
than misreading and then declining to enforce it.67  If one rejects that 
presupposition—and some do—one probably thinks that the canon of 
constitutional avoidance ought to go.68  Whatever one thinks of any of 
these doctrines in terms of substance, however, the point here is just 
that uncertainty-management doctrines are, in contrast to evidence-
management doctrines, unpuzzling in terms of form.  With each such 
doctrine, the idea is, again, that erring in some direction constitutes 
                                                          
63 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 5 (2006) (arguing that “judges should interpret 
legal texts in accordance with rules whose observance produces the best consequences 
overall” (emphasis added)). 
64 See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980 (holding that courts must enforce an agency’s reading 
“even if the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best statutory 
interpretation”). 
65 Again, the benefits of adhering to an uncertainty-management doctrine may accrue 
in the aggregate, as opposed to in each individual case.  See supra note 63 and 
accompanying text. 
66 See infra Part III.B. 
67 See infra Part III.A. 
68 Or at least be adjusted.  See id. 
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“playing it safe.”  That approach to reasoning under conditions of 
uncertainty is both familiar and straightforward. 
 
* * * 
 As Justice Kagan remarked, federal judges in the United States 
are “all textualists now.”69  But what does that mean, exactly?  It is part 
of our law of statutory interpretation that judges may not deviate from 
“clear” statutory text.  As this Part has explained, however, this 
exaltation of “clear” text is (ironically) ambiguous.  Perhaps non-
coincidentally, this ambiguity corresponds to a theoretical disagreement 
about what makes a method of statutory interpretation “textualist” in 
the first place. 
 Understood one way, textualism is mainly a view about the 
legitimate sources of statutory meaning.70  Textualist judges are, on this 
picture, ones who attend in statutory cases to “semantic” sources like 
statutory language, dictionaries, and linguistic canons, and who ignore 
or deemphasize “policy” sources like, most famously, legislative 
history.71 Corresponding to this picture of textualism, the various 
evidence-management doctrines discussed in Part I.A instruct courts to 
prioritize “semantic” sources over “policy” sources through lexical 
ordering, barring consideration of “policy” sources if consideration of 
“semantic” sources yields a clear answer. 
Understood another way, however, textualism has less to do with 
legitimate sources of statutory meaning and more to do with legitimate 
sources of law.72  On this picture, textualist judges treat what statutory 
                                                          
69 Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the 
Reading of Statutes at 8:09 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-
lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation. 
70 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 
1288 (2010) (“Textualism maintains that judges should seek statutory meaning in the 
semantic import of the enacted text and, in so doing, should reject the longstanding 
practice of using unenacted legislative history as authoritative evidence of legislative 
intent or purpose.”). 
71 John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 
70, 94–95 (2006) (“In short, textualists give precedence to contextual evidence 
concerning likely semantic usage while purposivists do the same with contextual cues 
that reflect policy considerations.”). 
72 See Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 NW. U. L. REV.. 811, 828 (2016) (“As 
textualists have long argued, the best (and perhaps only) way for Congress to identify 
specific [legislative] means is for it to use specific words.”); John F. Manning, The New 
Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 116 (2011) (“If interpreters treat the statutory 
text as simply a proxy for the law’s ulterior purpose, they deny legislators the capacity, 
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language communicates (or maybe better, seems to communicate73) as a 
statute’s presumptive contribution to the law.74  In turn, such judges 
refuse to deviate from what Congress “said” to advance some apparent, 
more general policy aim.75  Corresponding to this picture, the different 
uncertainty-management doctrines considered in Part I.B require 
courts to prioritize statutory meaning over other potential sources of 
law.  These doctrines permit courts turn to supplementary, non-
linguistic sources of law, but only if the primary source of law, statutory 
meaning, is uncertain. 
 These two ways of thinking about textualism are compatible but 
logically distinct.  One could, for example, accept that what a statute 
says is the law, but also that “policy” sources are just as important as 
“semantic” ones when figuring out what it is that a statute says.76  
Analogously, while one might incline towards both uncertainty-
management doctrines like Chevron and evidence-management 
doctrines like the conditional admissibility of legislative history, one 
could easily, depending in part upon one’s theoretical inclinations, go in 
for only one. 
 A follow-on question77 is whether it even makes sense to look at 
statutory meaning through an epistemic lens if one believes, pursuant 
to the second way of thinking about textualism, that statutory text “is 
not evidence of the law,” but instead “is the law.”78  The discussion of 
                                                          
through their choice of words, to distinguish those statutes meant to embody specific 
policy choices from those meant to leave policy discretion to the law’s implementers.”); 
see also Frederick Schauer, Law’s Boundaries, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2434, 2435-36 (2017) 
(“Law is a source-based enterprise, and understanding its nature accordingly requires 
understanding which sources constitute the law and which do not.”). 
73 See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
74 See Hrafn Asgeirsson, Can Legal Practice Adjudicate Between Theories of 
Vagueness?, in VAGUENESS AND LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 95, 
103-04 (Geert Keil & Ralf Poscher eds., 2016) (arguing that the communicative content 
of a statute is coextensive with its legal content absent some “rebutting” or 
“undercutting” source of law); Mark Greenberg, The Standard Picture and Its 
Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39 (Leslie Green & Brian 
Leiter eds., 2011) (calling the position according to which a statute’s legal content is 
identical to its communicative content the “standard picture,” articulating forceful 
objections against that position). 
75 Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“In holding 
otherwise, the Court replaces what Congress said with what it thinks Congress ought 
to have said ….”); see also Doerfler, supra note 72 at 823-34. 
76 See, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 
979, 995-98 (2017). 
77 Thanks to Dick Fallon for pressing me on this point. 
78 Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 82. 
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uncertainty management in Part I.B., for example, seems to presuppose 
that a judge could be unsure what a statute means at the end of her 
search for statutory meaning.  But how could that be if, as “text-is-the-
law” textualists insist, a statutory text means whatever a reasonably 
informed interpreter would think that it means?79  Put differently, if a 
statute is less than “clear” on this story, isn’t that just to say that that 
statute has no meaning for purposes of the case at issue?  Or, put 
differently, isn’t it to say that the statute’s meaning is 
underdetermined?  Setting aside difficult philosophical questions about 
the nature of underdeterminacy,80 one response is to observe that taking 
an ordinary epistemological approach to truths that are “whatever we 
think they are” is familiar from everyday life.  When one reads a work 
of crime fiction, for instance, one forms various hypotheses about the 
identity of the perpetrator, assigning probabilities to each.  Sometimes, 
however, the novel ends without the identity of the perpetrator being 
revealed.  In that situation, questions like “Who was the killer?” 
plausibly admit of no determinate answer.  And yet, awareness of that 
possibility (or, for that matter, its realization81) does nothing to prevent 
the reader from thinking about such questions in much the same way as 
she would if she were reading about some actual crime. 
 Building on that analogy, one way to understand “text-is-the-law” 
textualism is as providing a solution to the familiar problem of 
attributing communicative intentions to Congress despite Congress’s 
being a “they,” not an “it.”82  The solution this form of textualism 
provides is to have judges act as if legislation had a unitary author, 
attributing to that legislation whatever communicative intentions one 
                                                          
79 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392–
93 (2003) (“[Modern textualists] ask how a reasonable person, conversant with the 
relevant social and linguistic conventions, would read the text in context.”); Antonin 
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal 
Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (explaining that 
textualists appeal to “a sort of ‘objectified’ intent—the intent that a reasonable person 
would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus 
juris”). 
80 See S.G. Williams, Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
539, 545-54 (2004) (reviewing TIMOTHY A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN THE LAW (2000)) 
(surveying metaphysical and epistemological accounts of indeterminacy). 
81 See, e.g., Martha P. Nochimson, Did Tony Die at the End of The Sopranos?, VOX.COM 
(Aug 27, 2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/8/27/6006139/did-tony-die-at-the-end-of-
the-sopranos/. 
82 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as 
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992); see also Doerfler, supra note 76, at 
998-1020 (criticizing more recent attempts to analogize Congress to a corporation). 
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would attribute to its author as such.83  On this approach, reading 
statutory text is thus akin to reading a work of fiction, with the fiction 
being that Congress is an “it,” not a “they.”84  As with any other work of 
fiction, the reader naturally forms hypotheses about the work, assigns 
to them different probabilities, etc.  And, happily, none of this is 
impaired by the fact the “story,” so to speak, is sometimes cut short.85 
 
II. CATEGORICAL OBJECTIONS 
 
 As Part I explains, different “clarity” doctrines do very different 
things.  For that reason, it would be surprising if it were possible to 
assess them as a lot. 
A growing number of jurists and scholars are attempting 
nonetheless to do just that, arguing, roughly, that “clarity” doctrines are 
generally suspect because they are so hard to administer.86  More 
specifically, these critics complain that such doctrines produce 
unpredictable outcomes both because there is no consensus as to what 
they require, and because there is no way to establish whether that 
requirement (whatever it is) has been met. 
This Part addresses each of these complaints in turn.  First, it 
argues that the expectation of a universal “clarity” standard is 
misguided.  As philosophers have shown, the degree of epistemic 
confidence or justification required to call something “clear” varies from 
context to context.  More specifically, as the practical stakes of a 
situation increase or decrease, so too does the requisite confidence or 
justification.  Building upon this insight, this Part reasons that one 
should expect that how clear a statutory text must be to count as “clear” 
will vary from case to case, and, in particular, from doctrine to doctrine.  
Because different “clarity” doctrines serve different purposes, what it 
takes to satisfy them should be expected to differ as well.  Relative to 
                                                          
83 Doerfler, supra note 76, at 1024. 
84 Id. at 1022-31 (articulating a “fictionalist” account of congressional intent). 
85 In part, this is plausibly owed to the fact that one can always devote further cognitive 
resources to answering a question.  Especially when the pertinent evidence is varied 
and complex, it will often seem possible that, with additional consideration, a “clear” 
answer might reveal itself.  Further reflection might, in other words, render coherent 
a body of evidence that previously seemed conflicting or confusing. 
86 Kavanaugh, supra note 13; see also, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 14 at 62. 
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some doctrines, calling a text “clear” is, legally speaking, simply not a 
big deal.  Relative to others, however, it really is. 
Second, this Part urges that it is no easier to establish that a text 
is or is not “clear” than it is to show that, for example, one reading of a 
text is “better” than another.  As various critics rightly observe, in some 
cases it does seem that what best explains a court’s declaration that a 
statute is “clear” (or not) is the court’s policy preference and not the law.  
Be that as it may, the same is surely true in some cases in which a court 
says that one reading is “better” than another.  As this Part suggests, 
then, the worry that “clarity” doctrines are vulnerable to willfulness or 
motivated reasoning is just an instance of the more general worry that, 
in close cases, judges can and do (consciously or unconsciously) 
mischaracterize the law without serious reputational harm.  “clarity” 
doctrines are, in other words, indeed vulnerable to judicial willfulness 
or motivated reasoning.  That fails to distinguish them, however, from 
any other statutory interpretation doctrine. 
 
A. No Consensus What Required 
 
The first and most popular concern with “clarity” doctrines in 
general is that there is no consensus on how clear a statutory text must 
be to count as “clear” for doctrinal purposes.87  “If the statute is 60-40 in 
one direction, is that enough to call it clear?  How about 80-20?  Who 
knows?”88 
The basic question “How clear is clear?” is a reasonable one.89  If 
judges are supposed to base decisions upon whether a text is “clear,” 
they need to know what “clarity” requires.  More still, it does seem right 
                                                          
87 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 90; see also Brian G. Slocum, The Importance 
of Being Ambiguous: Substantive Canons, Stare Decisis, and the Central Role of 
Ambiguity Determinations in the Administrative State, 69 MD. L. REV. 791, 807–08 
(2010) (“There is no consensus regarding th[e Chevron] standard ….”); Note, “How 
Clear Is Clear” in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687, 1691 (2005) 
(“[Applying Chevron,] clarity or ambiguity is the test, and courts have not been 
consistent in the level of clarity that they require.” (internal quotation marks and 
alterations omitted)). 
88 Id. at 2137.  Justice Scalia also appears to have believed that the threshold for 
textual “clarity” was constant across cases.  See Scalia, supra note 25, at 520-21 
(analogizing Chevron to the plain meaning rule).  For a contrasting view, see Note, 
supra note 87, at 1688 (arguing that “the question ‘How clear is clear?’ should have a 
different answer depending upon the circumstances  
89 Scalia, supra note 25, at 520-21. 
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to suggest that textual clarity has something to do with epistemic 
confidence or justification: At a minimum, a statute cannot be “clear” if 
the two candidate readings are equally likely.  Before assessing whether 
60-40 is “enough,” though, it helps to step back and look at how speakers 
use epistemic terms like “clear” more generally. 
As philosophers have observed, people’s willingness to use certain 
epistemic terms varies according to the practical stakes.  More 
specifically, as the practical stakes of a situation increase or decrease, 
speakers become more willing or less willing to deploy terms like “know” 
or “clear,” holding constant the level of epistemic confidence or 
justification.90  The easiest illustration of this linguistic phenomenon are 
pairs of intuitive, everyday examples involving varying practical 
circumstances.  For instance: 
LOW STAKES: Two students are several spots down the 
waitlist for a seminar, and attending the first session is 
mandatory.  As they approach the seminar room, they see 
a line of eager students out the door.  Taking this seminar 
is not especially important to either.  Although the meeting 
time is fairly convenient, the topic does not interest either 
that much.  Looking at the line, one student suggests to the 
other, “Let’s go for food instead.”  The other student 
responds, “Are you sure?  The class time is really good for 
my schedule.”  The first student replies, “Just look at the 
line.  It’s clear that we’re not going to get in anyway.”   
HIGH STAKES: Two waitlisted students are approaching the 
seminar room, as in LOW STAKES, and notice the line out the 
door.  Again, one student again suggests to the other going 
out for food, reasoning that neither will make it off the 
waitlist.  In this case, however, getting into the seminar is 
very important to both.  The topic is in an area in which 
they would both like to work, and the professor is 
incredibly important and influential.  The other student 
reminds the first of these facts, and then says, “Sometimes 
people drop.  Is it really clear that we won’t get in?”  
Remaining as confident as she was before that neither will 
                                                          
90 See, e.g., KEITH DEROSE, THE CASE FOR CONTEXTUALISM (2009); Jason Stanley, 
KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICAL INTERESTS (2005); Jessica Brown, Contextualism and 
Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres, 130 PHIL. STUD. 407 (2006). 
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make it off the waitlist, still, she replies, “Well, no.  We’d 
better go in just to be safe.”91 
What these examples and others like them suggest is that the 
appropriateness of claiming that something is “clear” can be affected by 
the practical stakes.92  In LOW STAKES, it seems appropriate for the 
speaker to claim that it is “clear” that neither student will make it off 
the waitlist based upon apparent enthusiasm.  In HIGH STAKES, by 
contrast, it seems appropriate for the speaker to refrain from making 
such a claim, even though the evidence available to her concerning the 
chances of making it off the waitlist is the same.  What explains the 
difference?  Ostensibly, it is just that, in HIGH STAKES, the practical 
consequences of mistakenly acting on the premise that neither would get 
off the waitlist are much greater. 
Technical explanations of the above speech pattern vary.93  
Regardless, what these and other examples bring out is a 
straightforward connection between epistemic confidence or 
justification and practical interests.  On any of the prevailing technical 
explanations, it is appropriate to say that something is “clear” only if 
one has adequate epistemic confidence or justification as to that thing.  
And, on any of those explanations, what counts as adequate confidence 
or justification depends upon our practical interests.  In low-stakes 
situations, the truth of the proposition at issue (e.g., that the preferred 
candidate will win) matters to the conversational participants only a 
little.  As such, what speakers and listeners demand in those situations 
is just that someone who claims it is “clear” that that proposition obtains 
have moderate epistemic confidence or justification concerning that 
proposition.  By contrast, in high-stakes situations, the truth of the 
proposition in question matters a great deal to the parties involved.  For 
that reason, speakers and listeners demand in those situations that 
claims of “clarity” have significantly more epistemic support. 
By connecting epistemic confidence or justification and practical 
interests, the way we use terms like “clear” suggests an already intuitive 
link between epistemic and practical rationality.  To be more precise, it 
                                                          
91 See Doerfler, supra note 60, at 544 (using similar examples).  These examples are 
modeled on the so-called Bank Case, imagined by Keith DeRose.  See Keith DeRose, 
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions, 52 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 913, 
913 (1992) (demonstrating a similar pattern of usage for “knowledge” and its cognates). 
92 This discussion draws freely from Doerfler, supra note 60. 
93 Compare DEROSE, supra note 90 (arguing that epistemic terms are context-sensitive 
in a narrow, semantic sense) with Brown, supra note 90 (arguing that the pattern is 
best explained by appeal to pragmatic factors). 
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supports the principle that the epistemic confidence or justification 
required to act on some premise increases or decreases in accordance 
with the practical stakes.  To illustrate, consider again the examples 
above.  In LOW STAKES, not only is it appropriate for the speaker to say 
that it is “clear” that neither student will get off the waitlist, but also for 
her to act accordingly, walking right past the seminar room.  In HIGH 
STAKES, by contrast, the increased cost of acting erroneously on the 
premise that neither student would get off the waitlist requires that the 
speaker be more cautious both about what she says and about what she 
does. 
Returning to the law, what this suggests is that adhering to a “65-
35 rule” or a “90-10 rule” across cases probably makes little sense.  To 
say that a statutory text is “clear” is, as with anything else, to say that 
it is clear enough for present purposes.94  And because purposes vary 
from case to case, it would be surprising for 65-35, 90-10, or any other 
ratio to be exactly enough epistemic confidence or justification each and 
every time.  Perhaps in a run-of-the-mill statutory case, it would make 
sense for a court to be satisfied with 65-35 after looking at just the 
statutory text.  But in a major case?  Seems like there a court really 
ought to consider additional sources of statutory meaning, even if doing 
so would be especially costly.95 
In addition to varying from case to case, stakes can also shift from 
doctrine to doctrine.  Pursuant to the canon of constitutional avoidance, 
courts famously strain to read statutes in ways that let them avoid 
answering constitutional questions.96  As Chief Justice Holmes 
explained, “declar[ing] an Act of Congress unconstitutional … is the 
gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform” 
and so one that demands great caution.97  Courts will, for that reason, 
adopt an interpretation they deem less likely correct than some other if 
doing so will let them avoid calling a statute’s constitutionality into 
question so long as that less likely interpretation is at least “fairly 
possible,” which is to say so long as the constitutionally concerning 
                                                          
94 In this respect, “clear” behaves like any other gradable adjective.  To say that a 
basketball player is “tall,” for example, communicates one thing (e.g., that she is tall 
for a basketball player), while saying that a gymnast is “tall” something else (e.g., that 
she is tall for a gymnast).  See, e.g., STANLEY, supra note 90, at 35-37. 
95 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of 
Plain Meaning, 1990 S. CT. REV. 231 (arguing that “plain meaning,” in the sense of 
ordinary meaning, operates as a low-cost coordinating mechanism for judges in 
“uninteresting” cases). 
96 See infra notes 163-165 and accompanying text. 
97 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, C.J., concurring). 
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interpretation is not “clearly” correct.98  In practice, “fairly possible” 
turns out to be an easy threshold to satisfy, and so “clear” an especially 
difficult one—again, courts in this area appear closer to 90-10 than 65-
35.99  And given the alleged “grav[ity]” of invalidation, this should come 
as no surprise. 
Contrast this with the rule of lenity, a facially similar “clarity” 
doctrine that operates very differently on the ground.100  Just as the 
canon of constitutional avoidance tells courts to err in the direction of 
constitutionality, the rule of lenity says that “where there is ambiguity 
in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant.”101  
Despite this similarity, the rule of lenity does almost no work as applied, 
requiring only that a court adopt a defendant-friendly interpretation “if, 
after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, [that court] can 
make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.”102  In 
ordinary criminal cases, courts thus appear much closer to 65-35 if not 
51-49.  As Intisar Raab has argued, one possible explanation for this 
asymmetry is that courts have lost sight of some of the original 
constitutional justifications for the rule.103  Regardless, that courts 
apply this “clear” statement rule so much more casually suggests that, 
                                                          
98 Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 336 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
99 See infra notes 163-165 and accompanying text. 
100 See, e.g., United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 
(1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (“But when choice has to be made between two readings of 
what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the 
harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is 
clear and definite.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 
(1917) (“[B]efore a man can be punished as a criminal under the Federal law his case 
must be plainly and unmistakably within the provisions of some statute ….” (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
101 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); see also United States v. Universal 
C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.) (“But when choice 
has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it 
is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress 
should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.” (emphasis added)); 
Donnelley v. United States, 276 U.S. 505, 511 (1928) (recognizing “the familiar rule 
that one may not be punished for crime against the United States unless the facts 
shown plainly and unmistakably constitute an offense within the meaning of an act of 
Congress” (emphasis added)). 
102 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
103 See Intisar A. Raab, The Appellate Rule of Lenity, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 179, 201 
(2018) (arguing that Roberts Court’s reluctance to apply the rule of lenity is owed in 
part to its inattention to the liberty interests that underlie the doctrine). 
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as a matter of doctrine, the stakes of criminal cases are dramatically 
lower than those of would-be constitutional ones.104 
Whether courts should attend to differences in the practical 
stakes of individual cases is a difficult question.105  Far less 
controversial, though, is that courts may recognize differences between 
classes of cases that are encoded in the positive law.  As a strictly legal 
matter, how clear a statute has to be to count as “clear” for avoidance 
purposes is very different from what “clarity” requires for purposes of 
lenity.  This and similar differences reflect differences in the legally 
attributed stakes—as a doctrinal matter, avoidance cases are a much 
bigger deal than ordinary criminal cases.  One may or may not agree 
with that assessment, just as one may or may not agree with the familiar 
doctrinal assessment that criminal cases have higher stakes than civil 
cases.106  Either way, such implicit assignments of importance are a 
familiar feature of the law.  And so long as the importance assigned 
varies from doctrine to doctrine, the idea of a universal standard for 
what it takes to be “clear” is a non-starter. 
Even if a universal standard is not to be had, though, courts still 
need to know how clear a statutory text has to be to count as “clear” in 
an individual case.  Here then-Judge Kavanaugh expresses skepticism, 
remarking that “[n]o case or canon of interpretation says that my 65-35 
approach or my colleagues’ 90-10 or 55-45 approach is the correct one 
(or even a better one).”107  Similarly, Judge Easterbrook remarks, “The 
Rule of Lenity does not say how serious .. ambiguity must be” to trigger 
the rule.108  But is that right?  Remember, as construed, the rule of lenity 
applies only if a court “can make no more than a guess” as to what the 
statute means.  That sounds a lot like 55-45, and not at all like 90-10. 
Concededly, in other doctrinal areas, what “clarity” requires is 
much more contested.  In Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States,109 
Justice Gorsuch, writing for the majority, rejected an IRS interpretation 
of a tax statute, reasoning that “in light of all the textual and structural 
clues before us, we think it’s clear enough” that the IRS interpretation 
                                                          
104 But see infra Part III.B (considering an alternative explanation). 
105 On the one hand, it seems psychologically implausible to expect courts not to attend 
to such differences.  On the other, there does seem to be something unjust about courts 
treating some cases as more important than others. 
106 See Doerfler, supra note 60, at 550. 
107 Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 2138. 
108 Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 90. 
109 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018). 
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is incorrect.110  As discussed above, to say that a text is “clear” is always 
to say that it is clear enough for present purposes.  Still, the apparent 
implication of Justice Gorsuch’s phrasing was that “clear” within the 
Chevron framework is a relatively easy threshold to satisfy.  That same 
day, the Court also issued its opinion in Pereira v. Sessions.111  There 
again, the Court rejected an agency interpretation on the grounds that 
the statute at issue was “clear,” appealing to text, context, and “common 
sense.” 112 In dissent, Justice Alito accused the majority of “simply 
ignoring Chevron,” arguing that the majority’s interpretation was 
“textually permissible,” but that the choice between that interpretation 
and the agency’s was “difficult” and so the agency ought to have 
prevailed.113  Observing that “[i]n recent years, several Members of this 
Court have questioned Chevron’s foundations,” Justice Alito closed by 
insisting that “unless the Court has overruled Chevron in a secret 
decision that has somehow escaped my attention, it remains good 
law.”114 
These and other cases indicate a push by some jurists to 
understand “clarity” for Chevron purposes as less demanding than 
previously thought.115  Notice, however, that Justice Alito’s comment in 
Pereira indicates that this is a squarely doctrinal dispute.  According to 
Justice Alito, “Chevron’s foundations” establish that overturning an 
administering agency’s interpretation is a big deal, and so a statute 
must be quite clear for a court to do so.  Justice Gorsuch, by contrast, 
seems to think that, agency or no, courts have a duty to say what the 
law is, and so a statute’s being “clear enough” is enough.  Given Justice 
Gorsuch’s and others’ noted skepticism toward “the premises that 
underlie Chevron,”116 one fears, with Justice Alito, that Justice 
                                                          
110 Id. at 2074. 
111 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). 
112 Id. at 2110. 
113 Id. at 2121, 2129. 
114 Id. at 2129. 
115 Instructive here is Judge Raymond Kethledge’s recent remark that “as a judge, I 
have never yet had occasion to find a statute ambiguous” under Chevron.  Raymond 
M. Kethledge, Ambiguities and Agency Cases: Reflections After (Almost) Ten Years on 
the Bench, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 315, 320 (2017).  Charitably, Judge Kethledge’s 
statement indicates not that he has enjoyed 90-10 confidence in every Chevron case 
(epistemically implausible), but rather that his threshold for “clarity” is much lower 
than that. 
116 Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2121 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Given the concerns raised by 
some Members of this Court, it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an 
appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have 
implemented that decision.  The proper rules for interpreting statutes and determining 
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Gorsuch’s gloss on Chevron constitutes a subtle (or not so subtle) 
attempt to change the law.117  Either way, there is little reason to think 
that courts are incapable of debating openly what Chevron’s premises 
require, or, alternatively, whether those premises should be rejected.  In 
doctrinal areas subject to widespread disagreement, it may also be that 
the law is simply underdetermined—for instance, there may be no 
correct answer to the question how clear a statutory text has to be to 
count as “clear” for Chevron purposes.118   Legal indeterminacy is, 
however, a generic problem, which is to say there is little reason to think 
that “clarity” doctrines are especially prone to indeterminacy. 
Here it also helps to remember that to reject a “clarity” doctrine 
like Chevron is to take a position in the corresponding debate rather 
than to avoid it.  Again, the basic idea of Chevron is that courts “play it 
safe” by deferring to an administering agency when statutory meaning 
is uncertain, which is to say that the cost of mistakenly reversing an 
agency action is greater than the cost of mistakenly affirming it, either 
individually or in the aggregate.  Maybe that’s right, maybe it isn’t.  But 
to reject Chevron without having that discussion is just to act as if it 
isn’t.119 
 
B. Inevitably Biased Application 
 
 The other pervasive objection to “clarity” doctrines in general is, 
as Abbe Gluck puts it, that “we have no coherent, cabined, objective, or 
predictable definition” of “clarity” (or, conversely, “ambiguity”).120  The 
result, as then-Judge Kavanaugh describes it, is that “judgments about 
                                                          
agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord with constitutional 
separation-of-powers principles and the function and province of the Judiciary.”). 
117 In response to Wisconsin Central, one scholar remarked, “Perhaps the ‘clear enough’ 
standard will encourage circuit and district judges to lower their thresholds for finding 
clarity closer to the 50-50 range, thus narrowing the scope of Chevron deference at step 
one.”  Chris Walker, Gorsuch’s “Clear Enough” & Kennedy’s Anti-”Reflexive Deference”: 
Two Potential Limits on Chevron Deference, Notice & Comment (June 22, 2018), 
http://yalejreg.com/nc/gorsuchs-clear-enough-kennedys-anti-reflexive-deference-two-
potential-limits-on-chevron-deference/. 
118 See Scalia, supra note 25, at 520-21 (calling Chevron’s “clarity” standard 
“ambigu[ous],” predicting that “future battles” will be fought over the degree of clarity 
required to satisfy the doctrine). 
119 To return to an earlier analogy, to leave for the airport at whatever time seems 
more likely than not to be early enough to make the flight is to act as if it is no worse 
to miss the flight than to wait around at the gate. 
120 Gluck, supra note 22 at 2063. 
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clarity versus ambiguity turn on little more than a judge’s instincts,” 
making it difficult “for judges to ensure that they are separating their 
policy views from what the law requires of them.”121 
 The problem these critics allege can be broken into two parts.  The 
first is that determinations whether a statutory text satisfies some 
stipulated clarity threshold—say, 65-35—are largely unreasoned.  The 
second is that those determinations are (therefore) especially vulnerable 
to policy-bias. 
 Start with the first.  According to then-Judge Kavanaugh, 
whether a statute is “clear” or not “turns out to be an entirely personal 
question, one subject to a certain sort of ipse dixit.”122  As illustration, 
he cited MCI v. AT&T,123 a case in which the question was whether the 
Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) authority to “modify” a 
rate-filing requirement for common carriers included the authority to 
eliminate that requirement for all non-dominant long-distance 
carriers.124  The Court held 5-3 that it did not.  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Scalia began by observing that “[v]irtually every dictionary we 
are aware of says that ‘to modify’ means to change moderately or in 
minor fashion.”125  From there, Justice Scalia reasoned that eliminating 
the rate-filing requirement for such a large swath of long-distance 
customers was “much too extensive” to constitute a mere “modification” 
as it changed the statute “from a scheme of rate regulation in long-
distance common-carrier communications to a scheme of rate regulation 
only where effective competition does not exist.”126  In dissent, Justice 
Stevens emphasized that the Communications Act “gives the FCC 
unusually broad discretion to meet new and unanticipated problems,” 
and that, owed to new competition in the long-distance market, 
mandatory filing for non-dominant carriers served “no useful purpose 
and is actually counterproductive” in the FCC’s view.127  Responding to 
the argument that “modify” includes only “minor” changes, Justice 
Stevens observed that if the rate-filing section “is viewed as part of a 
[larger] statute whose aim is to constrain monopoly power, the 
Commission’s decision to exempt nondominant carriers is a rational and 
‘measured’ adjustment to novel circumstances—one that remains 
                                                          
121 Id. at 2138-39. 
122 Id. at 2142. 
123 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
124 Id. at 220. 
125 Id. at 225. 
126 Id. at 231-32. 
127 Id. at 235, 239. 
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faithful to the core purpose” of that section.128  For these and other 
reasons, Justice Stevens concluded that the FCC’s interpretation was, 
at the very least, “permissibl[e]” and so ought to control under 
Chevron.129 
 Whichever side got the better of the exchange in MCI, it can 
hardly be described as unreasoned.  Both Justice Scalia and Justice 
Stevens offer up familiar sorts interpretive arguments, explaining why 
one reading is more likely correct than the other—or at least likely 
enough (or not) for purposes of Chevron.  Such arguments are exactly 
what one would expect in any statutory case.  Because MCI is a Chevron 
case, the burden of persuasion is different— “clear,” as opposed to more 
likely than not.  The evidence put forward is, however, the same.  
Another way of putting the point is that, in terms of reasoned decision 
making, all that doctrines like Chevron do is increase the applicable 
evidentiary threshold (as explained below, the story is slightly more 
complicated for evidence-management doctrines like the plain-meaning 
rule).130  Thus, unless one is a skeptic about statutory interpretation in 
general, there is little reason to think that decisions made under a 
“clarity” standard are anything other than “rational.”131  In terms of 
“neutral[ity], impartial[ity], and predictab[ility],”132 it is hard to see why 
51-49 would fare any better than, say, 65-35. 
 Professor Gluck (along with Judge Easterbrook) grounds her 
pessimism in a discussion of Lockhart v. United States,133 a case that 
involves the rule of lenity.134  This Article assesses Lockhart below.135  
For now, it suffices to say that, as in MCI, both the majority and dissent 
in that case (there, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan) each offer a wide 
range of familiar interpretive arguments—exactly the sorts of 
                                                          
128 Id. at 241. 
129 Id. at 245. 
130 See infra notes 152-153 and accompanying text. 
131 To their credit, Professor Gluck and Judge Easterbrook tilt in that direction, 
decrying what Judge Easterbrook calls an “absence of method” in statutory 
interpretation.  See Easterbrook, supra note 25, at 83; accord Gluck, supra note 22, at 
2058 (expressing concern that “true formalism in statutory interpretation might be 
impossible”). 
132 Kavanaugh, supra note 13, at 2137. 
133 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016). 
134 See Abbe R. Gluck, Congress, Statutory Interpretation, and the Failure of 
Formalism: The CBO Canon and Other Ways That Courts Can Improve on What They 
Are Already Trying to Do, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 193 (2017); Easterbrook, supra note 
25, at 90. 
135 See infra notes 214-225 and accompanying text. 
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arguments one would expect to see even if the rule of lenity (or any other 
“clarity” doctrine) were irrelevant to the case. 
 So why, then, does it seem to many that judgments about “clarity” 
are “arbitrary,” a reflection of judicial “policy preference” as opposed to 
the law?  In part, that perception is probably owed to implicit 
disagreements between judges in individual cases as to how clear a text 
has to be to count as “clear.”  As discussed above, whether “clarity” for 
Chevron purposes requires 65-35 or 90-10 is a legal question that can 
and must be subjected to legal argumentation.  Be that as it may, judges 
are not always good about debating such issues openly and explicitly.  In 
Wisconsin Central, for instance, Justice Gorsuch simply presupposes 
that “clear enough” is enough for Chevron, rather than explaining why 
“clarity” is not especially demanding under that doctrine.  Insofar as 
such disagreements remain implicit—which is to say unargued—it is 
easy to see how one might think that something like differences in policy 
preference are what explain them.  What this suggests, however, is that 
judges need to be open and honest about such doctrinal disagreements, 
and not try to introduce indirectly their preferred view of the law. 
 In other part, though, this widespread perception is presumably 
owed to some number of disagreements about “clarity” really being 
disagreements about policy.136  Whether consciously or unconsciously, 
judges (like the rest of us) occasionally exaggerate or understate the 
likelihood of legal claims based upon their views of what would be 
good.137  So long as judges care about their reputations, the degree to 
which they exaggerate or understate in this way is constrained.138  If a 
reading of some statute is clearly correct, a willful or motivated judge 
could mischaracterize that reading as merely “likely” without serious 
reputational harm.139  To mischaracterize it as “clearly incorrect” would, 
                                                          
136 See, e.g., Solan, supra note 10, at 865 (“[A]t times courts themselves may not be 
sincere when they hold that the language of a statute is clear.”) 
137 See generally Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCH. BULLETIN 
489 (1990). 
138 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Votes of Other Judges, 105 GEO. L.J. 
159, 182 (2016) (observing that if “all judges always act solely so as to promote the 
interests of their political party,” then normative interpretive theory is pointless); 
Solan, supra note 10, at 866 (“Surely our understanding of language does some work 
in limiting the range of plausible interpretations of legal texts, and a great deal of work 
at that.”). 
139 See Doerfler, supra note 72, at 840-41.  Importantly, the suggestion here is not that 
judges are reputation maximizers.  Considerations like the practical significance of a 
given case might, for example, affect a judge’s willingness to incur reputational harm, 
or, alternatively, her blindness to the reputational harm that might result from 
adopting a particular reading.  Similarly, the argument here need not assume that the 
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however, result in significant criticism.140  Assuming that’s right, one 
should expect that judges will sometimes exaggerate or understate the 
likelihood of different readings in close cases, moving readings above or 
below the threshold of “clear” depending on what advances their 
partisan interests.  Whether an agency action is deemed “clearly” 
precluded, for example, may indeed turn on who is in the White 
House.141 
 As the above suggests, though, willfulness or motivated reasoning 
pose a problem in close cases generally.142  In an ordinary statutory case, 
a judge could, without embarrassing herself, mischaracterize a merely 
likely interpretation as “unlikely.”  And because it is an ordinary case—
that is, a case in which the evidentiary threshold is more likely than 
not—that would be enough to alter the outcome.  Here again the 
question is why think that judges would have an easier time 
exaggerating or understating the likelihood of various readings if the 
epistemic threshold were, say, 65-35, as opposed to 51-49?  In any 
statutory case, there has to be some line past which the moving party 
prevails.143  And wherever that line happens to be, the risk of willfulness 
or motivated reasoning will be greater the closer a case is to that line.144 
                                                          
only determiner of judicial reputation is apparent conformity of judicial decision 
making with what the law is.  See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the 
Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 627-31 (2000) 
(considering various possible determiners of judicial reputation). 
140 At least assuming the relevant audience is not similarly willful or motivated. 
141 On the assumption that the Supreme Court cases are closer on average than circuit 
court cases, this might help explain the empirical observation that Chevron constrains 
the latter more reliably than the former.  See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, 
Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 9 (2017) (“Although Chevron may 
not have much of an effect on agency outcomes at the Supreme Court (based on prior 
empirical studies of the Court), it seems to matter markedly in the circuit courts.”). 
142 The following argument assumes that would-be legal disputes are distributed 
evenly across the interpretive probability spectrum, both in terms of numerosity and 
practical significance.  This assumption is based upon the “principle of insufficient 
reason.”  See VERMEULE, supra note 63, at 173–75 (observing that it is rational under 
certain circumstances to assume that unknown probabilities are equal).  Ex ante, there 
is no reason to believe that there are more, or more consequential, practical disputes 
that turn on questions of statutory interpretation near the 51-49 line, as opposed to 
the 65-35 line (or any other). 
143 Remedies aside, outcomes of legal disputes are binary, not scalar. 
144 David Pozen suggests that “clarity” standards might be especially vulnerable to 
motivated reasoning because claims of interpretive “necessit[y] … allow advocates to 
hide from themselves the ineradicable contingency and ambiguity of legal meaning 
and the ineradicable discretion and responsibility that follow.”  David E. Pozen, 
Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 HARV. L. REV. 885, 936 (2016).  Even if that’s right, one 
would expect its marginal significance to be limited by the textualist turn in statutory 
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 Worth mentioning here, the degree to which textual “clarity” 
judgments are vulnerable to motivated reasoning may depend upon the 
way in which “clarity” questions are framed.  In an intriguing empirical 
study, Ward Farnsworth, Dustin Guzior, and Anup Malani found that 
when asked directly whether a statutory text is “ambiguous,” 
interpreters’ judgments were strongly biased by their respective policy 
preferences..145  By contrast, when interpreters were asked whether 
“ordinary readers would agree about the statute’s meaning,” the effect 
of the interpreter’s policy preference disappeared.146  Based upon this 
finding, Professors Farnsworth, Guzior, and Malani argue that legal 
doctrines that assign significance to textual “ambiguity” ought to turn 
on what they call “external” judgment, which is to say judgments about 
how ordinary readers would understand the text at issue), and not 
“internal” judgments, which is to say judgments about how the judge 
understands the statute. 
In terms of doctrine, courts are neither clear nor consistent about 
whether “ambiguity,” or, alternatively, “clarity” determinations are 
supposed to be “internal” or “external.”  Sometimes, courts hint that 
what matters is how an “ordinary” person would understand statutory 
language.147  Other times, however, the suggestion is that what courts 
care about is how an “ordinary Member of Congress would have read” 
the text in question.148  Most of the time, though, courts give no 
indication that how some other person would understand a statutory 
text is of interest—the question instead is just what did Congress 
mean?149  As a constitutional matter, the guarantee of “fair notice” 
grounded in the Due Process Clause would seem to recommend the 
“ordinary” person frame.150  Add to this the practical advantages 
                                                          
interpretation.  The reason is that, following that turn, courts can already disavow 
responsibility for it decision in a statutory case (e.g., “Congress made me do it!”) 
without having to blame the “clear” text. 
145 Farnsworth, Guzior, & Malani, supra note 9, at 259-60. 
146 Id. 
147 E.g., Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Statutory 
construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption 
that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative 
purpose.”). 
148 E.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
149 See, e.g., F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 294 (2012) (“[O]ur task is to determine 
what Congress meant by ‘actual.’”); U. S. Dep’t of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 
U.S. 595, 599 (1982) (“The language of Exemption 6 sheds little light on what Congress 
meant by ‘similar files.’”); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 143 (1914) (“[I]t is 
essential to understand what Congress meant in the use of that term ….”). 
150 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“A conviction fails to 
comport with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a 
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identified by Professors Farnsworth, Guzior, and Malani, and it seems 
that courts would do best to resolve any doctrinal inconsistency or 
underdeterminacy in that direction.  This is especially so if, as most do, 
one regards congressional intent as something of a “construct,” in which 
case courts cannot avoid defining the appropriate epistemic perspective 
from which to evaluate a statutory text.151  But even if not, it seems both 
legally plausible and normatively desirable that a statutory text is only 
clear enough to count as “clear” if an “ordinary” or “reasonable” person 
would regard it as “clear” (attending to the practical stakes, and so on). 
 
* * * 
 As indicated above, addressing concerns about willfulness or 
motivated reasoning is comparatively easy when it comes to 
uncertainty-management doctrines.    With respect to the search for 
statutory meaning, uncertainty-management doctrines have no bearing 
on what evidence a court should consider.  Instead, all that such 
doctrines do is increase the degree of epistemic confidence or 
justification needed for a court to enforce some reading.  Whether, for 
example, a case falls within Chevron’s domain has no bearing on what 
evidence of statutory meaning a court should consider, or, in turn, the 
“rationality” or vulnerability to policy bias of its interpretive reasoning. 
 By contrast, with evidence-management doctrines, the story is 
slightly more complicated.  Under an evidence-management doctrine, 
the evidence of statutory meaning a court may consider is potentially 
different and somewhat more limited than it would be if that doctrine 
did not apply.  A court may, for example, judge it appropriate to enforce 
a statutory reading under the plain-meaning rule after considering only 
the statutory text, to the exclusion of other pertinent, non-textual 
                                                          
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited ….”); BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (1996) (“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in 
our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice ... of the 
conduct that will subject him to punishment ....”). 
151 Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 359, 362 (2005) (observing 
that because “Congress is a collective entity,” the “concept of legislative ‘intent’ is 
obviously something of a construct for textualists and intentionalists alike,” and that 
textualists and intentionalists both limit interpreters to “publicly available” evidence).  
On such an approach, a judge would presumably limit herself to reasonably available 
information as well as reasonably shared normative and non-normative assumptions.  
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Statutory Interpretation Muddle (manuscript) 
(discussing the relevance of overlapping linguistic intuitions to theories of 
interpretation operating with an “objectified” conception of congressional intent). 
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evidence.  Such a judgment might fairly be characterized as less 
“rational”152 than one arrived at after considering the excluded evidence 
in addition.  Generally speaking, judgments are more accurate and more 
stable the more evidence upon which they are based.   And at least 
insofar as non-textual evidence is excluded on grounds of, say, cost,153 a 
judgment arrived at under the plain-meaning rule is not only less 
accurate, but also more vulnerable to willfulness or motivated reasoning 
than an ordinary interpretive judgment.  The reason is that the 
evidentiary basis for that judgment is comparatively thin.  That tradeoff 
may be worth it.  Sometimes “cheap and good enough” is the right 
approach.  Still, it is important to recognize that with uncertainty-
management doctrines like Chevron, there really is no tradeoff in terms 
of “rationality.”  With evidence-management doctrines like the plain-




 Parts I and II dealt with “clarity” doctrines mostly in the abstract.  
This Part is more concrete, discussing in detail four familiar “clarity” 
doctrines: the canon of constitutional avoidance, the rule of lenity, the 
“plain meaning” rule as it applies to legislative history, and Chevron.  As 
the discussion illustrates, whether a specific doctrine is best understood 
as an evidence-management doctrine or, instead, as an uncertainty-
management doctrine is sometimes not obvious.  Correspondingly, 
whether or in what form these doctrines should be preserved can be a 
difficult question. 
 This Part also highlights how sorting different “clarity” doctrines 
into different categories can help settle longstanding questions about 
the order in which such doctrines should be applied.  As it explains, 
because uncertainty-management doctrines help courts deal with 
uncertainty that remains after the search for statutory meaning, courts 
should almost always apply evidence-management doctrines—which 
organize that search—before applying the former type of doctrine.  As 
this Part explains, this simple observation leads to some surprising 
results, including, for example, that courts should afford agencies 
Skidmore deference before deciding whether a statute is “clear” for 
                                                          
152 Though probably not as “irrational.” 
153 As opposed to, say, psychological bias.  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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purposes of Chevron, or that courts should consider legislative history 
when determining whether Congress has “clearly” abrogated state 
sovereign immunity. 
 
A. Constitutional Avoidance 
 
 In its “modern” form, the canon of constitutional avoidance 
instructs courts to adopt a less natural but “fairly possible” 
interpretation of a statute if giving that statute its “most natural” 
interpretation would raise “substantial constitutional questions.”154  
The stated justifications for the doctrine vary slightly.  Sometimes 
courts ground the avoidance canon in “due respect” for Congress as a 
“coordinate branch of the government.”155  Other times, they emphasize 
the practical wisdom of adjudicating constitutional questions only if 
necessary.156  The overall sentiment, though, seems best captured by 
Chief Justice Holmes’s remark, mentioned above, that declaring an act 
of Congress constitutionally invalid is a “grave” and “delicate” duty and 
so one that courts should approach with great caution.157 
 Looking at these various statements, the canon of constitutional 
avoidance is characterized most straightforwardly as an uncertainty-
management doctrine.  Again, the motivating idea is that declaring a 
statute unconstitutional is a really big deal.  And from this, courts 
apparently infer that they should address constitutional questions only 
if really sure that a statute means what they think that it means.  But 
does that make sense?  Does the “grav[ity] and “delica[cy]” of judicial 
review really get one to the avoidance canon in its modern form?  At the 
outset, it is worth mentioning that taking an especially cautious 
approach to statutory interpretation is only one way for courts to “play 
it safe” in this space.  Alternatively or in addition, courts could take a 
similarly cautious approach to constitutional interpretation, declaring 
invalid an act of Congress only if really sure that the Constitution means 
                                                          
154 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994); see also U.S. ex rel 
Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co, 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (conditioning 
avoidance on “grave and doubtful constitutional questions”). 
155 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879). 
156 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 463 U.S. 147, 157 (1983) (recognizing “the 
Court’s prudential policy of construing acts of Congress so as to avoid the unnecessary 
decision of serious constitutional questions” (emphasis added)); N.L.R.B. v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979) (same). 
157 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, C.J., concurring). 
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what the court thinks that it means.158  Beyond that, there is the 
familiar question of why the avoidance canon should be triggered by 
mere constitutional “questions,” as opposed to actual 
unconstitutionality.159  In terms of avoiding unnecessary denunciation 
of Congress, the latter would seem to suffice.160 
Even retreating to “classic” avoidance, questions about the canon 
remain.161  As discussed above, the premise of any uncertainty-
management doctrine is that the costs of mistake are asymmetric.  With 
the avoidance canon, the thought seems to be that misinterpreting a 
statute and then declaring it invalid is worse than misreading that 
statute and then enforcing it.  Maybe that’s right.  Misreading a statute 
and then declaring it invalid does seem like adding insult to injury.162  
But even if so, the more difficult question is how much worse is it, really?  
In practice, courts bend over backwards to avoid constitutional 
                                                          
158 Cf. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of 
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
159 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983) (arguing that conditioning avoidance on 
constitutional questions “create[s] a judge-made constitutional ‘penumbra’”); see also 
Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (“[I]t is by no 
means clear that a strained interpretation of a federal statute that avoids a 
constitutional question is any less a judicial intrusion than the judicial invalidation on 
constitutional grounds of a less strained interpretation of the same statute.”). 
160 The switch from “classic” to “modern” avoidance appears to have been motivated by 
the concern that “when a court engages in classical avoidance, it provides what 
amounts to an advisory opinion on a constitutional issue.”  Trevor W. Morrison, 
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1204–05 
(2006). 
161 Eric S. Fish, Constitutional Avoidance As Interpretation and As Remedy, 114 Mich. 
L. Rev. 1275, 1279 (2016) (“Under the classic doctrine of avoidance, judges only avoided 
interpretations that would actually make the statute unconstitutional.”); see also 
Blodgett, 275 U.S. at 148 (Holmes, C.J., concurring) (“[A]s between two possible 
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the 
other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.”). 
162 On the other hand, misinterpreting and then enforcing a statute involves giving 
force to a policy with no constitutional legitimacy … also not great. 
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questions, enforcing “strained,”163 “implausible,”164 or even “tortured”165 
interpretations of statutes. 
Here, the easiest contemporary illustration is Bond v. United 
States.166  In that case, a Pennsylvania woman had spread dangerous 
chemicals on the “car door, mailbox, and door knob” of her “closest 
friend” upon learning of an extramarital affair between the friend and 
the woman’s husband.167  Federal prosecutors subsequently charged the 
woman with two counts of possessing a “chemical weapon,” in violation 
of the federal statute implementing the near-identically worded 
international Convention on Chemical Weapons.168  The statute defines 
“chemical weapon” in relevant part as “[a] toxic chemical and its 
precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under 
this chapter as long as the type and quantity is consistent with such a 
purpose.”169  “Toxic chemical,” in turn, is defined as “any chemical which 
through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 
incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”170  Lastly, the 
statute defines “purposes not prohibited by this chapter” as “[a]ny 
peaceful purpose related to an industrial, agricultural, research, 
medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other activity,” and other specific 
purposes.171  The chemicals used by the woman in the attacks were, 
concededly, “toxic to humans and, in high enough doses, potentially 
lethal.”172  At the same time, it was “undisputed” that the defendant “did 
                                                          
163 John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. 
CT. REV. 223, 254 (2000) ([T]he Court itself has often recognized that the avoidance 
canon may compel acceptance of a ‘strained’ interpretation ….”). 
164 William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 865 (2001) (“[T]he most common and persuasive objection to 
the avoidance canon is that it leads to implausible constructions of statutory language 
….”). 
165 Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme 
Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2112 (2015) (“[Aggressive 
application of the canon] leads to tortured constructions of statutes that bear little 
resemblance to laws actually passed by the elected branches.”). 
166 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
167 Id. at 2085. 
168 Id. at 2085-86; see also 18 U.S.C. § 229 (a)(1); Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, Apr. 29, 1997, 1974 U.N.T.S. 317; S. Res. 75, 105th Cong. (1997). 
169 18 U.S.C. § 229F (1)(A). 
170 Id. § 229F (8)(A). 
171 Id. § 229F (7)(A). 
172 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085. 
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not intend to kill” the friend, and instead “hoped” that the friend would 
“touch the chemicals and develop an uncomfortable rash.”173 
Following her conviction, the defendant argued on appeal that 
federal criminalization of this sort of domestic assault exceeded 
Congress’s enumerated powers and invaded powers reserved to the 
states by the Tenth Amendment.174  In so arguing, the defendant seemed 
to call into question the century-old precedent Missouri v. Holland,175 
which stated that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about 
the validity of the statute” that implements it “as a necessary and proper 
means to execute the powers of the Government.”176  The Supreme 
Court, however, avoided the constitutional issue, holding instead that 
the statute did not reach the defendant’s conduct.  The statute’s 
definitional sections notwithstanding, Chief Justice Roberts explained 
that the “ordinary meaning” of the phrase “chemical weapon” calls to 
mind “chemical warfare,” not “spreading irritating chemicals on [a] 
doorknob.”177  Chief Justice Roberts emphasized moreover that our 
“constitutional structure” leaves the prosecution of “purely local crimes” 
to the states, and so one should hesitate to attribute to Congress the 
intention to “upset the Constitution’s balance between national and 
local power” by “defin[ing] as a federal crime conduct readily denounced 
as criminal by the States.”178 
Whatever one thinks of the Chief Justice’s reasoning, it seems 
likely that the Court would have held that the statute applied to the 
defendant’s conduct absent the extraordinary circumstances: The 
chemicals that possessed and used were “potentially lethal” and so 
seemingly “toxic,” and her “purpose” was evidently not “peaceful.”  
Q.E.D.179  Indeed, the Chief Justice seemed to concede as much in his 
opinion, remarking that an otherwise “clear” statutory text can be made 
“ambigu[ous]” by the “deeply serious consequences of adopting” its 
otherwise most natural reading.180 
The practice of straining to avoid constitutional questions that 
one sees in Bond and other, similar cases would plausibly be justifiable 
                                                          
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 2086. 
175 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
176 Id. at 432. 
177 Id. at 2090. 
178 Id. at 2083, 2090, 2093 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
179 Id. at 2094 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“End of statutory analysis, I would have 
thought.”). 
180 Id. at 2090. 
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if the cost of declaring a statute invalid based on a misreading were 
dramatically greater than the alternative.181  If erroneous non-
enforcement truly were catastrophic, then requiring something 
approaching absolute certainty concerning statutory meaning before 
declaring a statute invalid would seem to make both practical and 
epistemic sense.  And yet, how plausible is that?  In terms of 
constitutional duties, interpreting statutes faithfully and accurately is 
also incredibly important.  And from an inter-branch perspective, it is 
less than obvious why Congress would prefer systematic 
misinterpretation to the occasional erroneous non-enforcement.182  Even 
conceding that, from Congress’s perspective, erroneous non-enforcement 
is worse than mere misreading,183 to make sense of cases like Bond, one 
would, again, have to claim that it is so much worse that it is worth 
avoiding at almost any cost in terms of interpretive accuracy. 
 Qua uncertainty-management doctrine, then, the classic 
avoidance canon is conceivably justified, assuming an easy-to-satisfy 
threshold for “clarity.”184  Getting to modern avoidance, or to the now-
familiar, very demanding “clarity” threshold seems, however, much 
more doubtful. 
 Another approach would be to reconceive the canon of 
constitutional avoidance as an evidence-management doctrine.  
According to Justice Scalia, for example, the avoidance canon rests on 
the “reasonable presumption” that “between competing plausible 
interpretations of a statutory text,” Congress “did not intend the 
alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.”185  One way of 
interpreting Justice Scalia’s characterization is as saying that whether 
an interpretation “raises serious constitutional doubts” is simply 
evidence of statutory meaning.186  That seems plausible.  Members of 
                                                          
181 See Doerfler, supra note 60, at 552 (explaining that “courts’ assessment of what is 
‘fairly possible’ in [modern] cases is plausibly (and reasonably) affected by the 
perceived practical stakes”). 
182 See Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 165, at 2113 (arguing that aggressive application 
of the modern avoidance canon “can be even more antidemocratic than outright 
invalidation, by putting in place a law that Congress did not want and that, because 
of various inertial forces laced into our constitutional system, Congress will not be able 
to change”). 
183 For instance, because constitutional holdings have broader ramifications for 
Congress’s ability to legislate generally. 
184 Or maybe better, a “best guess” standard, with a slight thumb on the scale in favor 
of actually constitutional readings.  See infra notes 226-230 and accompanying text. 
185 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005). 
186 The alternate interpretation is that Justice Scalia is claiming that Congress prefers 
that courts resolve statutory unclarity in ways that avoid serious constitutional 
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Congress swear an oath to uphold the Constitution.187  It is thus only 
charitable to assume that Congress intends readings of statutes that are 
consistent with its constitutional authority.  Even with respect to 
constitutional questions, one might argue that members of Congress 
take (or should take) a cautious approach to exercising its legislative 
powers.188  On this line of reasoning, courts should assume that Congress 
“plays it safe” when it legislates, enacting laws that are clearly within 
its enumerated powers.  In so doing, Congress would avoid accidental 
constitutional excess, even if at the expense of legislating less 
expansively than it otherwise could.189 
 Suppose one finds that story persuasive.  Is that enough to rescue 
the avoidance canon in its modern form?  Maybe.  As discussed in Part 
I, evidence-management doctrines like the one proposed here are 
epistemically puzzling.  Ordinarily, evidence that is helpful to an 
investigation should be considered as a matter of course.  In this case, 
assuming uncertain constitutionality is evidence of statutory meaning, 
the question is why not consider it in every case, weighing it against 
other evidence like statutory structure or apparent purpose?  
Understood as an evidence-management doctrine, what the canon of 
constitutional avoidance instructs courts to do is to determine whether 
a statute has a “clear” meaning based upon evidence other than 
uncertain constitutionality (or, in the case of classic avoidance, actual 
unconstitutionality).  Only if the answer is “no” should courts go on to 
consider whether one of the seemingly available readings would raise 
“substantial constitutional questions” (or, alternatively, be 
constitutionally invalid).  Again, the question is what would justify that 
conditional structure? 
                                                          
concerns.  So interpreted, Justice Scalia’s characterization would be analogous to the 
doctrinal justification for Chevron, which is that Congress intends that courts resolve 
statutory unclarity in administrative cases by deferring to administering agencies.  See 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) 
(explaining agency deference by appeal to implicit congressional delegation). 
187 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
188 See Fallon, supra note 151 (arguing that attribution of attitudes to Congress as such 
is an unavoidably normative task). 
189 Another “advantage” of conceiving of the avoidance canon as an evidence-
management doctrine is that it would provide a principled justification for the current 
judicial practice of applying that canon when determining whether a statutory text 
counts as “clear” for Chevron purposes.  See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf 
Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); see also infra notes 
246-267 and accompanying text. 
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 One possibility is cost.  If figuring out whether some reading 
would raise “substantial constitutional questions” were especially costly, 
courts would potentially be justified in asking that question only after 
attending to other, less expensive evidence of statutory meaning.  Is that 
plausible, though?  Conceivably, actually answering “substantial 
constitutional questions” takes serious work.  For that reason, cost-
efficiency might provide an alternate justification for the avoidance 
canon in its classical form.190  But merely identifying “substantial” 
questions? 
 Another, more promising possibility is psychological bias.  If 
uncertain constitutionality is probative of statutory meaning, but, for 
reasons of psychological bias, judges are disposed to overweight it, it 
could make sense for judges to consider whether a reading would raise 
“substantial constitutional questions” only if other, less biasing evidence 
is insufficient to rule it out.  And that really does seem plausible.  Given 
the alleged “gravity” of judicial review, it is all too realistic that judges 
would overweight uncertain constitutionality in an unconscious effort to 
avoid having to even contemplate declaring an act of Congress invalid.191  
As a check against that bias, courts might be justified, then, in asking 
whether some reading is “clearly” correct wholly apart from any 
constitutional questions it might raise, considering apparent 
constitutionality only if the answer is “no.” 
 Notice, however, that even if reconceiving the avoidance canon as 
an evidence-management doctrine helps make sense of the doctrine 
being triggered by mere constitutional “questions” or “doubts,” it does so 
at the cost of reducing substantially the legal significance of 
constitutional questionability or doubtfulness.  By analogy, the plain 
meaning rule conditions consideration of legislative history upon textual 
unclarity, but says nothing about the weight of legislative history in 
relation to other sources—a court might, for example, determine that 
legislative history is moderately supportive of reading A, but decide that 
the totality of evidence supports reading B.  The canon of constitutional 
avoidance, by contrast, traditionally treats apparent constitutionality as 
a trumping consideration if courts consider it at all.  Treating apparent 
constitutionality as a trump makes sense if erring in that direction 
constitutes “playing it safe” under conditions of uncertainty.  If, 
                                                          
190 Though remember the tradeoffs in terms of willfulness and motivated reasoning 
that would be involved.  See supra notes 152-153 and accompanying text. 
191 Or, for that matter, to avoid having to do the hard work involved in answering 
“substantial constitutional questions.”  
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however, apparent constitutionality is merely evidence of statutory 
meaning, it would likely be outweighed in various cases by various other 
familiar sources such as text, structure, and apparent purpose.  Put 
differently, reconceiving the avoidance canon as an evidence-
management doctrine might get one from classic to modern avoidance, 
but it would probably do so at the expense of rendering the canon 




 The rule of lenity famously instructs courts to resolve any 
unclarity in a criminal statute in favor of the defendant.192  Like 
Chevron, the rule of lenity seems hard to understand as an evidence-
management doctrine.  Recent attitudinal shifts notwithstanding, the 
political climate in the United States has, at least since the 1980s, 
supported an unusually harsh approach to criminal sentencing,193 as 
well as an expansive attitude toward criminalization.194  Given this 
reality, that a reading of a contemporary criminal statute is relatively 
harsh probably makes it more likely, not less, to be the one that 
Congress intended.195 
  So what about uncertainty management?  Characterizing lenity 
as an uncertainty-management doctrine fits neatly with the rule’s 
stated justifications.  Other than historical pedigree,196 courts invoking 
the rule of lenity tend to cite two considerations in support.  The first is 
                                                          
192 See, e.g., United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (“In these 
circumstances—where text, structure, and history fail to establish that the 
Government’s position is unambiguously correct—we apply the rule of lenity and 
resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant’s] favor.”). 
193 Unusual in relation to the global statistical norms.  See Yes, U.S. Locks People Up 
at a Higher Rate than Any Other Country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-locks-
people-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-any-other-country/. 
194 See DOUGLAS HUSAK OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3 
(2008) (describing the “explosive growth in the size and scope of the criminal law”). 
195 This is true even for those concerned with “objectified” intent, see supra note 79 and 
accompanying text, insofar as one infers just from the harshness and scope of 
contemporary criminal statutes a disposition towards the punitive rather than the 
lenient. 
196 See United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 310 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment) (recognizing the “the ancient requirement that 
criminal statutes speak plainly and unmistakably” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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that it is the role of “legislatures, not courts, [to] define criminal 
liability.”197  The second is that criminal defendants are entitled to 
“adequate notice of the conduct that the law prohibits.”198 
 On defining criminal liability, the thought here seems to be that 
the criminal law is, in some places, either underdetermined or 
unknowable.199  For that reason, holding a defendant liable in one of 
those places would, either de jure or de facto, amount to law declaration 
rather than law identification.  The connection with managing 
uncertainty is straightforward, given that way of thinking.  Assuming 
there is an illegitimacy cost to convicting a defendant for conduct not 
knowably prohibited at the time, it would be safer for a court to allow 
conviction only if it actually knows that the conduct was prohibited. 
 The same story applies to adequate notice.  There, the illegitimacy 
of convicting a defendant for conduct not knowably prohibited at the 
time has less to do with separation of powers than with due process and 
basic fairness.  Here again, though, the easiest way to avoid that sort of 
illegitimate conviction is to permit conviction for conduct a court knows 
is prohibited.  Which is to say, conduct “clearly” proscribed by the 
statute.200 
 Even if the rule of lenity is justified in some form, though, maybe 
the more interesting question is how demanding a “clarity” threshold 
the rule can sustain.  As mentioned above, the doctrine as presently 
construed applies only if a court “can make no more than a guess” as to 
statutory meaning.201  In a criminal case, in other words, a statute is 
“clear” at something much closer to 55-45 than to 90-10—and, as a 
result, “recent judicial applications of the rule appear to be rare.”202  
What this easy-to-satisfy threshold suggests, then, is that, even if erring 
in a defendant’s favor constitutes “playing it safe” in a criminal case, 
very little caution is required because the stakes in such cases are low.  
That might seem surprising.  As suggested by, for example, the 
increased burden of proof for criminal conviction or the relative severity 
                                                          
197 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990). 
198 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 397 (2005). 
199 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.  
200 Someone with consequentialist leanings might object that any illegitimacy costs 
associated with conviction for not-knowably-prohibited conduct is offset by the welfare 
gains of punishing socially harmful behavior.  See Daniel Epps, The Consequences of 
Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1089-92 (2015) (describing such 
objections). 
201 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
202 Note, The New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2427 (2006). 
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of criminal sanctions, a seeming premise of our legal system is that 
criminal conviction is a really big deal.203  If that’s right, though, what 
accounts for the relative ease with which courts declare criminal 
statutes “clear,” thereby triggering severe criminal sanctions, and so on? 
 To understand how little work lenity does, consider two cases, one 
an old chestnut204 and another more recent.  First, in the familiar Smith 
v. United States,205 the defendant had traded a fully automatic MAC-10 
assault rifle to an undercover officer for two ounces of cocaine.206  Among 
other offenses, the defendant was subsequently charged with and 
convicted of “using” a firearm “during and in relation to ... [a] drug 
trafficking crime.”207  On appeal, the defendant argued that use for 
purposes of exchange did not constitute “us[e]” of a firearm in the 
relevant sense.208  6-3, the Supreme Court held that it did.  Writing for 
the majority, Justice O’Connor observed that various dictionaries as 
well as previous caselaw defined “to use” broadly to include “to employ” 
and “to derive service from.”209  Reasoning that the defendant had 
plainly “employed” and “derived service from” his firearm, the statute, 
she concluded, plainly applied to his conduct.210  In dissent, Justice 
Scalia marshalled various ordinary language examples in support of the 
proposition that “[t]o [‘]use[‘] an instrumentality ordinarily means to use 
it for its intended purpose.”211  Moving from the general to the specific, 
Justice Scalia inferred that, as used in the statute, “us[e]” of a firearm 
was most naturally read as use as a weapon.212  Bolstering his legal 
conclusion that the defendant in the case ought to prevail, Justice Scalia 
added that, “[e]ven if the reader does not consider the issue to be as clear 
as I do, he must at least acknowledge, I think, that it is eminently 
                                                          
203 See Doerfler, supra note 60, at 550. 
204 Or maybe better, middle-aged. 
205 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
206 Id. at 225-26. 
207 Id. at 226-27 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(23) 
(imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment if the “firearm” 
used is a “machinegun”); 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (defining “machinegun” to include 
automatic weapons).  
208 Smith, 508 U.S. at 228. 
209 Id. at 228-29 (quoting Astor v. Merritt, 111 U.S. 202, 213 (1884)). 
210 Id. at 229.  Justice O’Connor also emphasized that there was no indication that 
Congress intended to deviate from the “ordinary” meaning of the term at issue.  Id. at 
228. 
211 Id. at 242 (“When someone asks, “Do you use a cane?,” he is not inquiring whether 
you have your grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he 
wants to know whether you walk with a cane.”). 
212 Id. at 242-44. 
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debatable—and that is enough, under the rule of lenity, to require 
finding for the [defendant] here.”213 
 Second, in the more recent Lockhart v. United States,214 the 
defendant had been convicted of possession of child pornography.215  
Based upon a previous conviction for sexual abuse of his then-53-year-
old girlfriend, the defendant was subsequently deemed subject to a 10-
year mandatory minimum sentence applicable to offenders with “a prior 
conviction ... under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual 
abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or 
ward.”216  On appeal, the defendant argued that his prior conviction was 
not for “sexual abuse … involving a minor or ward,” and so the 
mandatory minimum did not apply.217  Again, the Supreme Court 
disagreed, this time 6-2.  Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor 
explained that the qualifier “involving a minor or ward” attached only 
to the last item on the list of offenses, namely “abusive sexual conduct,” 
meaning that the defendants prior conviction for “sexual abuse” of an 
adult was sufficient to trigger the mandatory minimum.218  In defense 
of that reading, Justice Sotomayor offered ordinary language 
analogies,219 as well as an appeal to something called the “rule of the 
last antecedent.”220  Justice Sotomayor also drew support from “nearly 
identical[ly]” worded statutes in which it was clear that “sexual abuse” 
meant sexual abuse of any kind.221 In dissent, Justice Kagan argued 
that the qualifier “involving a minor or ward” took scope over the entire 
list of triggering offenses.222  In support of her reading, Justice Kagan, 
too, offered colorful (and topical) analogies, observing, for example, that 
“a real estate agent [who] promised to find a client ‘a house, condo, or 
apartment in New York’” would not have fulfilled with her promise by 
                                                          
213 Id. at 246. 
214 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016). 
215 Id. at 961. 
216 Id. at 961-62 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2)). 
217 Id. at 962. 
218 Id. at 961. 
219 Id. at 963 (“For example, imagine you are the general manager of the Yankees and 
you are rounding out your 2016 roster.  You tell your scouts to find a defensive catcher, 
a quick-footed shortstop, or a pitcher from last year’s World Champion Kansas City 
Royals.  It would be natural for your scouts to confine their search for a pitcher to last 
year’s championship team, but to look more broadly for catchers and shortstops.”). 
220 Id. at 962-63 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003)). 
221 Id. at 964 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-43). 
222 Id. at 969. 
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sending “information about condos in Maryland or California.”223 Like 
Justice Sotomayor, she also attempted to support her position with a 
purported principle of positive law—this time, the “series-qualifier 
canon.”224  And finally, like Justice Scalia in Smith, Justice Kagan 
appealed to lenity, reasoning that even if the case were “less clear” than 
her opinion suggested, surely the statute was at least ambiguous and so 
the defendant ought to prevail.225 
 Again, one reading of cases like Smith and Lockhart is that judges 
regard criminal cases as having remarkably low stakes.  In each case, 
even if one is disposed to agree with the majority’s reading, it is hard to 
suggest that the majority’s arguments are dramatically more forceful 
than those of the dissent.  But if that’s right, it is correspondingly 
difficult to imagine that the majority in either case was substantially 
more confident—let alone reasonably more confident—in their reading 
than 55-45.  And, again, if 55-45 is enough to count as “clear” for 
purposes of lenity, convicting someone of a criminal offense is being 
treated by courts as akin to giving up on an uninteresting seminar. 
 Another, more charitable explanation of what is going on in those 
cases, though, is that, although accepting that the stakes of criminal 
cases are high, courts regard the costs of mistake as closer to symmetric 
than our legal tradition might suggest.226  “[B]etter that ten guilty 
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer” is, as Dan Epps puts it, 
“perhaps the most revered adage in the criminal law.”227  Owed to the 
relative severity of criminal sanctions, criminal adjudication is biased 
against false convictions in various ways that, for example, civil 
adjudication is not similarly biased against false judgments of liability.  
Implicit in this bias, of course, is that the cost of false acquittals is 
comparatively low.  As scholars going back to Bentham have argued, 
however, the cost of false acquittals to crime victims is also significant, 
                                                          
223 Id. (“Imagine a friend told you that she hoped to meet ‘an actor, director, or producer 
involved with the new Star Wars movie.’  You would know immediately that she 
wanted to meet an actor from the Star Wars cast—not an actor in, for example, the 
latest Zoolander.”). 
224 Id. at 970 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1574 (2014)). 
225 Id. at 977. 
226 A less charitable explanation is that courts fail to take seriously the severity of 
criminal sanctions.  See Raab, supra note 103, at 188 (highlighting the “infringements 
on liberty that have resulted in the discriminatory mass incarceration, 
overcriminalization, and overpunishment that characterize the American criminal 
justice system today”). 
227 Epps, supra note 200, at 1067. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3326550 
47 
 
even if not quite as significant as the cost of false convictions to 
convicts.228 
Taking that seriously, what contemporary courts might be 
thinking is that criminal adjudication is similar to decision-making 
scenarios in which it is appropriate to act on one’s “best guess” under 
conditions of uncertainty.  To illustrate, suppose that a bomb is about to 
explode, and that a technician can cut one of two wires, red or green.  
Cutting the correct wire will diffuse the bomb; cutting the incorrect wire 
will cause the bomb to explode. Suppose now that a technician is 
moderately confident—say, 65-35—that cutting the red wire will diffuse 
the bomb.  In that situation, it would, given the stakes, be unreasonable 
for the technician to think it “clear” that cutting the red wire will diffuse 
the bomb.  Be that as it may, she should obviously cut the red wire.   
Given the symmetry of the costs of mistake, the rational thing for the 
technician to do is to act on her inclination, however modest. 
Turning back to criminal adjudication, assume ala Bentham that 
the cost of false acquittals is high, but that the cost of false convictions 
is slightly higher—as seems entirely plausible in cases involving cocaine 
and machineguns or serial sex offenders.  On that assumption, how 
should a court behave if it is moderately confident—again, 65-35—that 
a defendant’s conduct is covered by a criminal statute?  As in the bomb 
scenario, it would be unreasonable, given the stakes, for the court to say 
that it is “clear” that the defendant acted unlawfully.  At the same time, 
considering the near symmetry of the costs of mistake, it is plausible 
that courts should nonetheless enforce the more likely reading of the 
statute, acting, in other words, on its “best guess.”229  As bad as wrongful 
conviction might be, failing to enforce the criminal law is not to be taken 
lightly, in particular when the potential offenses are so serious. 
The above story also fits with how courts talk about lenity today.  
While the rule of lenity is classically phrased as a rule for “resolv[ing] 
ambiguity,” present doctrine is that the “simple existence of some 
statutory ambiguity” is not enough to “warrant [the rule’s] application,” 
and that instead a court should afford lenity only if it has “no more than 
a guess” as to statutory meaning.  What this suggests is that, as 
presently understood, the rule of lenity does not actually require “clear” 
statutory meaning, however much clarity that would require.  To the 
                                                          
228 See id. at 1089-92. 
229 In terms of expected utility, what to do would depend upon how slight the cost 
asymmetry turns out to be. 
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contrary, so long as a court has more than a literal “guess” as to what 
Congress intended, a court should enforce the reading of the statute it 
thinks is most likely correct.  That there are other plausible readings is 
neither here nor there.230 
 
C. Legislative History 
 
Under current doctrine, courts should consult legislative history 
only if the corresponding statutory text is less than “clear.”231  This 
doctrine is most naturally and most commonly understood as managing 
evidence of statutory meaning.232  For those who do so at all, considering 
legislative history helps to “illuminat[e] … what Congress meant,” 233 
“shed[ding] light” on the correct reading of the statutory language at 
issue.234 
Objections to considering legislative history at all are, at this 
point, familiar.  Justice Scalia and others famously characterized 
reliance upon legislative history as effectively permitting members of 
Congress (as well as lobbyists and staffers) to circumvent Article I, 
§ 7.235  In addition, he worried that attending to legislative history left 
                                                          
230 The story here is also consistent with continued adherence to the “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard of proof in criminal cases.  Insofar as it applies to factual, 
as opposed to legal, determinations, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard might 
serve merely to offset structural advantages at trial enjoyed by the prosecution.  Cf. 
Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1979) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The Bill of 
Rights does not envision an adversary proceeding between two equal parties.”). 
231 E.g., N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 942 (2017) (“The text is clear, so we 
need not consider this extra-textual evidence.”); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory 
interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s 
understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.”); Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 
209, 215 (2005) (“Because the meaning of [the provision’s] text is plain and 
unambiguous, we need not accept petitioners’ invitation to consider the legislative 
history.”); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147–48 (1994) (“[W]e do not resort to 
legislative history to cloud a statutory text that is clear.”). 
232 For a contrary view, see EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO 
INTERPRET UNCLEAR LEGISLATION 115-16 (2008) (arguing that resolving statutory 
unclarity by appeal to legislative history may appropriate if doing so helps “to 
determine which interpretation will maximize expected political satisfaction”). 
233 U.S. Dep’t of State v. Washington Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982).  
234 Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 124 (1985) (“The legislative history of [the statute] 
sheds light on its meaning.”). 
235 See, e.g., Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1176-77 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in principal part and concurring in the judgment); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 
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judges with nearly unbounded discretion.236  More modestly, Adrian 
Vermeule has argued that we have no reason to believe that judges are 
any good at evaluating legislative history,  which leaves courts without 
justification for the tremendous cost that researching legislative history 
involves.237 
 On the other side of this jurisprudential dispute, those who 
believe that attending to legislative history is useful occasionally insist 
that courts should do so as a matter of course.  Justice Stevens, for 
example, reasoned that, although “[in] recent years the Court has 
suggested that we should only look at legislative history for the purpose 
of resolving textual ambiguities,” it would be “wiser to acknowledge that 
it is always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress’ 
true intent when interpreting its work product.”238 
As discussed above, Justice Stevens’s reasoning has initial 
plausibility.239  Assuming arguendo that legislative history is probative 
of statutory meaning, courts would improve their interpretive accuracy 
by considering it in any given case.240  Sometimes, though, interpretive 
accuracy isn’t everything.  Even if one is more optimistic than Professor 
Vermeule concerning courts’ ability to evaluate legislative history, it 
seems hard to deny that conducting legislative-history research is, as he 
puts it, “costly and time-consuming.”241  As Judge Leventhal cautioned, 
“[j]udicial investigation of legislative history has a tendency to become 
… an exercise in “‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’”242  
To protect against that tendency, responsible legislative-history 
research requires independent and comprehensive assessment of a 
sometimes “massively voluminous” set of materials.243  Even assuming, 
then, that judges come out at the end of that process with more accurate 
beliefs about statutory meaning, very often cost involved will not be 
                                                          
519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 
87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
236 See Scalia, supra note 79, at 35-36. 
237 VERMEULE, supra note 63, at 107-15, 192. 
238 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004). 
239 See supra Part I.A. 
240 Assuming, that is, that courts are not unduly biased in favor of legislative history 
in comparison with other sources of statutory meaning.  Because legislative history is 
most often characterized by its critics as a sort of Rorschach test, it is not entirely clear 
what being biased in its favor even comes to. 
241 VERMEULE, supra note 63, at 193. 
242 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (quoting 
Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983)). 
243 VERMEULE, supra note 63, at 193 
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justified by the resulting accuracy gain.  Again, sometimes “cheap and 
good enough” really is good enough. 
So when (if at all) should courts consider legislative history?  The 
short answer is: whenever it is worth it.  Again, when judging whether 
a statutory text is “clear” for purposes of some “clarity” doctrine, a court 
is determining whether that text is clear enough for the relevant 
purposes.244  For the purpose of managing cost, a court might thus deem 
a statutory text “clear” in a relatively unimportant case based upon 
moderate epistemic confidence or justification.245  With so little at stake, 
why take on the additional burden of wading through a “massively 
voluminous” set of materials to improve interpretive accuracy only 
somewhat?  By contrast, in a more significant case, a court might declare 
a text less than “clear” even assuming analogous epistemic justification 
or confidence.  In that situation, a sufficient amount would be on the line 
to justify consulting additional, more expensive sources of statutory 
meaning. 
Assuming, then, that legislative history is probative of statutory 
meaning, the doctrinal status quo seems defensible, at least in relation 
to other, cheaper sources of statutory meaning.246  More concerning is 
the status quo as it pertains to the relationship between legislative 
history and other “clarity” doctrines.247  In United States v. R.L.C.,248 for 
instance, the question before the Court was how to interpret a statute 
limiting juvenile detention to the “maximum term of imprisonment that 
would be authorized if the juvenile had been tried and convicted as an 
adult.”249  In that case, the defendant had been convicted of committing 
an act of juvenile delinquency.250  The district court imposed a sentence 
of three-years’ detention, reasoning that three-years’ imprisonment was 
the maximum sentence for the analogous offence under the 
corresponding statute.251  The Court of Appeals reduced the defendant’s 
sentence to 18 months, explaining that 18-months’ imprisonment was 
                                                          
244 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
245 See Schauer, supra note 95. 
246 Indeed, current doctrine seems agnostic as to the probative value of legislative 
history insofar as consideration of legislative history is permitted but not required if 
statutory text is less than “clear.”  See Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574 (2011). 
247 See Gluck, supra note 22, at 2063 (“It remains unanswered whether a policy canon 
is still relevant if legislative history alone would clarify statutory language.”). 
248 503 U.S. 291 (1992). 
249 Id. at 294 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(1)(B)). 
250 Id. at 295 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 5031). 
251 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1112(b) (imposing a maximum sentence of 3-years’ 
imprisonment for involuntary manslaughter). 
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the maximum sentence a court could have imposed on a similarly 
situated adult after applying the Sentencing Guidelines.252  Writing for 
a plurality, Justice Souter started with the statutory text, determining 
that the Government’s harsher interpretation was, at best, “one possible 
resolution of statutory ambiguity.”253  Justice Souter then went on to 
consider the Act’s legislative history, concluding ultimately that the 
accompanying Senate Report and “other elements” resolved any 
ambiguity in the defendant’s favor.254  Concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas 
and Kennedy, insisted that once the Court had concluded that the 
statutory text was at most “ambiguous,” that should have been the end 
of the case.255  The reason, according to Justice Scalia, was that it was 
“not consistent with the rule of lenity to construe a textually ambiguous 
penal statute against a criminal defendant on the basis of legislative 
history.”256 
The rule of lenity is, again, most plausibly characterized as an 
uncertainty-management doctrine—as an empirical matter, there is 
little reason to think that members of Congress prefer narrower, as 
opposed to broader, definitions of federal crimes, nor is there any 
indication that federal judges would be unduly biased in favor of that 
consideration if it were true.257   Given that characterization, it is hard 
to see why there should be any uncertainty whether courts should 
consider legislative history within the lenity framework.  What the rule 
of lenity does, after all, is help courts “play it safe” in criminal cases 
under conditions of uncertainty.  But if considering legislative history 
could help courts become certain of statutory meaning, why not do so in 
the course of determining whether there is a need to “play it safe”?258 
                                                          
252 R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 295-96; see also U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 2A1.4(a)(2) (1991). 
253 R.L.C., 503 U.S. at 298. 
254 Id. at 303-05. 
255 Id. at 307-08. 
256 Id. at 307; see also United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 429 (2009) (debating 
whether legislative history could be considered to make “clear” a statute before the 
rule of lenity would be applied). 
257 Again, one can reason similarly about Congress’s “objectified” intent.  See supra 
note 195 and accompanying text. 
258 Alternatively, considering legislative history could make a court uncertain about 
statutory meaning, in which case it would have discovered that it has reason to “play 
it safe.”  Either way, what is relevant is that, by considering legislative history, a court 
will have improved its epistemic position, thereby making it assessment concerning 
the need to allocate risk better informed. 
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The inference above is, of course, a general one, applying to 
uncertainty-management doctrines across the board.259  Consider, for 
example, Dellmuth v. Muth,260 in which the Court held: 
Legislative history generally will be irrelevant to a judicial 
inquiry into whether Congress intended to abrogate the 
Eleventh Amendment.  If Congress’ intention is 
“unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,” 
recourse to legislative history will be unnecessary; if 
Congress’ intention is not unmistakably clear, recourse to 
legislative history will be futile, because by definition [the 
presumption against abrogation is not overcome].261 
The “clear statement” rule concerning state sovereign immunity is 
almost certainly about managing uncertainty, as opposed to managing 
evidence.262  As the Court explained in Atascadero State Hospital v. 
Scanlon,263 judicial “reluctance to infer that a State’s immunity from suit 
in the federal courts has been negated stems from recognition of the vital 
role of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in our federal system.”264  
Owed to the “special and specific position in our constitutional system,” 
the Court continued, it is thus “incumbent upon the federal courts to be 
certain of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law overrides the 
guarantees of the Eleventh Amendment.”265 
 Taking Atascadero at its word, then, construing a federal statute 
as not abrogating state sovereign immunity constitutes “playing it safe” 
under conditions of uncertainty for the reason that unsettling the “usual 
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government” 
is a really big deal.266  Whatever one thinks of that assessment, it is, 
again, hard to see why courts ought not to consider legislative history 
when determining whether Congress has spoken with “unmistakabl[e] 
                                                          
259 Again, courts do consider legislative history within the Chevron framework.  See 
supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
260 491 U.S. 223 (1989). 
261  Id. at 230 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). 
262 See Eskridge, supra note 27, at 613 (characterizing the application of pro-federalism 
canons by courts as “activist”).  The same is likely true of, for example, the other pro-
federalism canons.  Seem e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991) 
(recognizing a “clear” statement rule concerning federal regulation of fundamental 
aspects of state sovereignty); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 241 (1947) 
(recognizing a presumption against federal preemption of state law). 
263 473 U.S. 234 (1985). 
264 Id. at 242. 
265 Id. at 243. 
266 Id. at 242-43. 
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cl[arity].”  Even conceding that statutory text is the “best evidence” of 
what Congress intends,267 it is, by no means, the only evidence.  And 
what that means is that, at least in some cases, turning from statutory 
text to legislative history will eliminate (or create) doubt—again, 




Chevron holds that a reviewing court should enforce an agency’s 
reading of a statute that the agency administers so long as the agency’s 
reading is not “clear[ly]” inconsistent with the statutory text.268  As the 
Court in that case explained, resolving statutory unclarity very often 
amounts to a “policy choice[],” and within our constitutional system, the 
“‘responsibilit[y]’” for such choices resides with “‘the political 
branches.’”269  In view of that explanation, Chevron is understood most 
naturally as an uncertainty-management doctrine.  An agency’s views 
within the Chevron framework are, as discussed above, not treated as 
evidence of statutory meaning.270  To the contrary, a reviewing court 
defers to an agency only if statutory meaning has run out, or, at the very 
least, is uncertain.  Resolving statutory unclarity is, consistent with this 
story, characterized as “fill[ing]” a “gap” in the law left by Congress.271  
The absence of identifiable law is what makes it appropriate to defer to 
a more technically competent and more politically accountable 
agency.272 
In terms of uncertainty management, the thought here seems to 
be that, at a certain point, ‘interpreting’ an unclear statute amounts to 
policymaking insofar as the content of the law is underdetermined or, 
alternatively, unknowable.273  Reversing an agency action in such 
                                                          
267 West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) (“The best 
evidence of [Congress’] purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of 
Congress and submitted to the President”); but see Baude & Doerfler, supra note 11, 
at 562 (observing that the relative probative value of textual and non-textual evidence 
is “difficult to assess on a categorical basis”) 
268 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
269 Id. at 866 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). 
270 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. 
271 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
272 Id. at 865-66. 
273 In the latter situation, even though there is law that settles the dispute in question, 
courts lack epistemic access to it and so must decide the case on non-legal grounds.  
See Hrafn Asgeirsson, Can Legal Practice Adjudicate between Theories of Vagueness?, 
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circumstances would thus amount to “substitut[ing]” a court’s policy 
choice for those of an agency—an agency tasked with making those sorts 
of choices.274  On that story, courts thereby “play it safe” by reversing an 
agency action only if they know there is law that precludes it.  “[E]ven if 
the agency’s reading differs from what the court believes is the best 
statutory interpretation,” the reasoning goes, best not to risk 
encroaching upon that agency’s assigned policymaking authority.275 
 Whether that reasoning makes sense may turn upon the correct 
understanding of the role of the judiciary.  “It is,” as we are reminded so 
often, “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is.”276  And, as Justice Thomas observes, “[t]hose who 
ratified the Constitution knew that legal texts would often contain 
ambiguities,” which is why “[t]he judicial power was understood to 
include the power to resolve these ambiguities over time.”277  Heard one 
way, Justice Thomas’s observation suggests that courts needn’t be so 
hesitant to fill statutory “gaps”—sometimes the law is unsettled, and it 
is the job of courts, and not agencies, to settle it.  Heard another way, of 
course, all that Justice Thomas’s observation entails is that courts 
should try to identify and declare statutory meaning, even if doing so is 
hard.  Legal texts are, uncontroversially, not always easy to make sense 
of.  Sometimes, though, courts can attend carefully to an “ambiguous” 
statute and figure out what it means.278  In those situations, ambiguity 
is indeed “resolved,” but resolved through discovery, as opposed to 
stipulation—that is, as opposed to policymaking.  If, then, the judicial 
power includes merely the “power” to say what the law is even if the law 
is hard to discern, that says very little about what courts should do if 
the law cannot be discerned, or at least not discerned with adequate 
confidence.279 
                                                          
in VAGUENESS AND THE LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 95 (Geert Keil 
& Ralf Poscher eds., 2016) (discussing epistemic and non-epistemic theories of legal 
indeterminacy). 
274 Id. at 843-44, 865-66. 
275 Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
980 (2005). 
276 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
277 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1217 (2015). 
278 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
279 Insofar as the role of the judiciary is to “say what the law is,” perhaps worth 
mentioning is that, on the standard account of assertion, it is appropriate to say that 
p (e.g., “The law is precludes the agency’s action.”) only if one knows that p (e.g., only 
if one knows that the law precludes the agency’s action).  See TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON, 
KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS 243 (2000). 
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 Rather than adjudicate that familiar dispute,280 though, it is 
maybe more interesting to consider Chevron’s doctrinal complement, 
Skidmore.281  Like Chevron, Skidmore puts a thumb on the scale in favor 
of agency readings.  Unlike Chevron, however, Skidmore appears to 
treat an agency’s views as evidence of statutory meaning.  To elaborate, 
Skidmore holds that an agency’s reading of some statute that agency 
handles is entitled to “respect proportional to its ‘power to persuade.’”282  
The opinion articulates numerous factors that help to determine the 
amount of “respect” a particular reading is owed, including “the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,” 
and, of special interest here, “its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements.”283  Most tellingly, Skidmore instructs courts to assign 
(potentially “considerable”) “weight” to an agency’s reading, weighing it 
along with other evidence of statutory meaning in an effort to determine 
the statute’s “better”284 or “correct”285 interpretation.286 
 It makes sense that agencies might have insight into what a 
statute means.  Statutes often deal with technical subject matter, and 
                                                          
280 For recent, helpful treatments of these and other objections to Chevron, see 
Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 
937 (2018) (considering both constitutional objections); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as 
Law (manuscript) (considering both constitutional and statutory objections, defending 
Chevron on stare decisis grounds). 
281 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136 (1944). 
282 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 235 (2001) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. 
at 140)).   
283 Here Skidmore contrasts importantly with Chevron.  See Nat’l Cable & 
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005) 
(holding that “agency inconsistency is not a basis for declining to analyze the agency’s 
interpretation under the Chevron framework”);  Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A., 
517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (“[C]hange is not invalidating, since the whole point of 
Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the 
implementing agency.”).  
284 Town of Stratford, Conn. v. FAA., 292 F.3d 251, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reasoning that 
if Chevron is inapplicable, then the “better” interpretation prevails). 
285 Campesinos Unidos, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 803 F.2d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 1986) 
(“Although not binding on this court, the Secretary’s interpretation of his own 
regulation is entitled to some deference, and here we believe that interpretation to be 
correct.” (emphasis added)). 
286 See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1256 (2007) (acknowledging that “most of the 
Court’s post-Mead applications of Skidmore review reflect the independent judgment 
model”); Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of 
Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1015 (2005) (“[Mead] basically instructs courts to exercise 
independent judgment regarding statutory meaning subject to the weak requirement 
that they carefully consider agency views for persuasiveness [if Chevron does not 
apply].”). 
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technical expertise can be an important interpretive resource when 
making sense of technical statutes.287  Agencies are also sometimes 
involved with the drafting of statutes, providing intimate knowledge of 
how those statutes were understood at the time of enactment.288  Last 
and most obvious, agencies deal with statutes on a day-to-day basis in 
all sorts of settings, providing awareness of both statutory details and 
overall structure.289 
 In terms of structure, Skidmore is, importantly, not a “clarity” 
doctrine.  Instead of telling courts to consider an agency’s views only if 
other sources leave statutory meaning uncertain, courts attend to such 
views in the course of the general interpretive inquiry.  That seems 
sensible insofar as it is hard to see what special consideration(s) would 
call for lexical ordering in this instance.  Taking account of an agency’s 
views is hardly cost-prohibitive.  Nor does it seem that courts would be 
unduly biased in an agency’s favor, at least controlling for partisan 
leanings. 
 More difficult to understand is why courts treat Skidmore and 
Chevron as alternatives.  Generally speaking, courts reason that 
Skidmore “respect” is owed in cases that fall outside of Chevron’s 
“domain.”290  That seems odd insofar as Skidmore and Chevron appear 
logically unrelated.  Again, under Skidmore, an agency’s views are 
evidence of statutory meaning.  Under Chevron, by contrast, those views 
constitute a legal basis for deciding a case if statutory meaning is 
unknown.  Assuming those two characterizations are correct, it seems 
unmotivated to consider an agency’s views as evidence of statutory 
                                                          
287 Hickman & Krueger, supra note 286, at 1249 (“[A]s the Skidmore Court 
acknowledged, courts often lack the resources and expertise to understand and 
evaluate fully the consequences of complex statutory schemes.”). 
288 See Jarrod Shobe, Agencies As Legislators: An Empirical Study of the Role of 
Agencies in the Legislative Process, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 451, 455 (2017) (describing 
“various ways … agencies are involved in legislative drafting”); see also Norwegian 
Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (explaining that an 
agency interpretation adopted contemporaneously with the statute’s passage has 
“peculiar weight”). 
289 Such awareness could serve as a helpful check against what Victoria Nourse terms 
“isolationist” interpretation.  See Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing Text: Lessons 
for Statutory Interpretation from the Philosophy of Language, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1409 
(2017)) (identifying and criticizing the practice “pull[ing] a term out of a statute and 
isolat[ing] it from the rest of the text”). 
290 See Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1441 (2017) (characterizing Mead as having “limited the scope of 
Chevron’s applicability to agency actions carrying the force of law and reinstated the 
multifactor Skidmore standard as an alternative for those that do not”). 
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meaning only in those situations in which an agency lacks the authority 
to make binding policy choices.291  To the contrary, insofar as the 
question for cases within Chevron’s domain is whether Congress has 
spoken “clearly,” it seems that, in the course of that inquiry, courts 
should afford an agency interpretation the “respect” such 
interpretations are owed. 
 Notice further that, insofar as courts were to afford Skidmore 
“respect” when determining whether a statutory text is “clear” for 
purposes of Chevron, the dispute between Justice Gorsuch and Justice 
Alito concerning how clear a text has to be to count as “clear” under 
Chevron would become less consequential.  Even if, after all, courts were 
to gravitate towards Justice Gorsuch’s position, treating 55-45 as the 
threshold for “clear,” insofar as courts were simultaneously to start 
treating the agency’s interpretation as evidence of statutory meaning, 
the overall framework would remain substantially deferential.292 
 To be sure, courts might also decide that affording “respect” to 
informal agency interpretations is better justified by appeal to 
pragmatic considerations like technical expertise and democratic 
accountability—that is, courts might reconceive Skidmore as an 
uncertainty-management doctrine.293  In that event, courts would 
presumably do best to reject consistency as an indicator of 
respectworthiness, just as they have with Chevron.294  More still, courts 
would need to transform Skidmore into a “clarity” doctrine, the reason 
being that, as with Chevron, an agency’s views would no longer be 
regarded as relevant to the question of statutory meaning.295  In other 
words, reconceived as an uncertainty-management doctrine, an agency’s 
informal views would only come in under Skidmore once statutory 
meaning had run out. 
                                                          
291 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 219 (explaining that a “very good indicator of delegation 
meriting Chevron treatment is express congressional authorizations to engage in the 
rulemaking or adjudication process”). 
292 Of course, if courts were to begin affording Skidmore “respect” when determining 
“clarity while also adhering to a relatively demanding clarity threshold, the overall 
framework would be even more favorable to agencies than it currently is. 
293 Cf. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1453 (2011) (observing an analogous “transformation” in the 
rationale for deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations). 
294 See supra note __ and accompanying text. 
295 On this approach, the degree of clarity required would, presumably, be inversely 
proportional to the degree of “respect” qua policy determination the agency’s informal 
views were owed. 






 Doctrines like Chevron or the plain meaning rule can be 
frustrating.  Sometimes courts declare statutory text “clear” (or not), and 
it seems grounded in little more than partisanship.  In such moments, 
it is tempting to say that “clarity” standards are the problem—too easily 
manipulated by willful or motivated judges.  The question, though, is, 
what is the alternative?  Why think that other standards would be any 
less easy to manipulate?  And assuming we adopted “clarity” doctrines 
for a reason, what would we be giving up by abandoning them? 
 “clarity” doctrines do require additional, more systematic 
scrutiny.  As this Article argues, though, such doctrines need to be 
scrutinized individually, not all in one go.  Chevron and the plain 
meaning rule do very different things and serve very different purposes.  
At the end of the day, it may be that courts do best to abandon one or 
both of those doctrines.  But if that’s true, it is for reasons having to do 
with those specific doctrines, and not with the abstract idea of “clear” 
text.  More still, those individual doctrines can be assessed in a perfectly 
rational and organized fashion.  As this Article shows, once one 
understands what different “clarity” doctrines do, it becomes much more 
straightforward to assess whether they do it well. 
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